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GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: JUDGES' RIGHTS AND
VIRGINIA'S JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW
COMMISSION
"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes" 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The headline read, "Pants-Dropping, Coin-Flipping Incidents
Cost Virginia Judge His Job."2 From the small town of Wise, Vir-
ginia, across the nation, and even across the Pacific Ocean to
Australia,3 the story of Judge James Michael Shull filled the ni-
nety-second sound bytes of the twenty-four-hour news machine.
Among other affronts, Judge Shull allegedly twice ordered a
woman to remove her pants in court.4 Of course, Judge Shull de-
fended his actions by noting that he never ordered the woman to
remove her pants, but that she offered to do so in order to prove
the existence of a disputed wound; Judge Shull claimed he first
declined her offer, but then he later allowed it when alternative
evidence was unavailable.5 Nevertheless, this portion of the facts
was absent from the media coverage of the story. In the end,
Judge Shull was removed from office when the Supreme Court of
Virginia found that Judge Shull violated the judicial canons. 6
1. JUVENAL, SATIRES, VI, 347-48.
2. Larry O'Dell, Pants-Dropping, Coin-Flipping Incidents Cost Va. Judge His Job,
ABC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2007, http://abcnews.go.comlTheLaw/wireStory?id=3812541.
3. Drop-Pants Judge Ruled out of Court, SUNDAY TIMES (PERTH, AUSTL.), Nov. 4,
2007, at 42.
4. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 662, 651 S.E.2d 648, 651
(2007).
5. Id. at 663-64, 651 S.E.2d at 652.
6. Id. at 675-76, 651 S.E.2d at 658-59. Jude Shull has since opened his own practice
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The story of Judge Shull is just one example of judicial impro-
priety. Other instances include the stories of Alcee Hastings, a
federal judge impeached for accepting over $150,000 in bribes in
exchange for favorable treatment at sentencing; 7 Harold Cobb
Maurice, who was removed from the bench for misappropriating
confiscated weapons and alcohol for personal use and illegal sale;8
and Robert Restaino, a Niagara Falls City Court Judge who was
removed after he jailed forty-six people in his courtroom because
each failed to claim responsibility for a cell phone that rang dur-
ing court proceedings. 9 In response to such judicial misconduct,
private citizens have formed several watchdog groups to combat
and report impropriety from the bench.10 And, although the oc-
currence of judicial misconduct is rare, history shows it is the
rare disaster that must be planned for; thus, all states, including
the District of Columbia, have created governmental agencies
charged with investigating allegations of judicial misconduct. 11
This comment examines the governmental entities created to
investigate judicial misconduct, with a focus on Virginia's Judi-
cial Inquiry and Review Commission, and addresses practical and
constitutional issues arising from their formation and exercise of
duties. Part II briefly discusses Virginia's history of removing
judges from the bench and punishing improper judicial conduct.
and spoke candidly about the events leading to his suspension, his feelings about the sus-
pension, and his life since being removed from the bench. See Daniel Gilbert, Ousted
Judge Reflects on His Bench Time, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER, May 25, 2008, http://
www.tricities.com/tri/news/local/consumer/article/James-Michael-Shull-doesnt-see-him
self as-one-of the-gang/9952.
7. Ruth Marcus, Senate Removes Hastings, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1989, at Al.
8. Tom Campbell, Judge James M. Shull Removed from Bench, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Nov. 3, 2007, at Al.
9. Judge Removed over Cell Phone Jailing, ABC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2007, http://abc
news.go.com/TheLaw/wireStory?id=3922077.
10. See, e.g., Black Robed Hooliganism, http://www.blackrobedhooligans.blogspot.com
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Center for Judicial Accountability Home Page, http:lwww.
judgewatch.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Corruption, Fraud and Judicial Misconduct
Home Page, http://injusticexposed.blogspot.com (last visited Oct.10, 2008); Judicial Abuse
Home Page, http://judicialmisconduct.blogspot.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Redress
Home Page, http://www.redressinc.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); Truth in Justice Home
Page, http://www.truthinjustice.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). In fact, judicial improprie-
ty was the basis of a book entitled The Benchwarmers, which discusses "shortcomings of
the judiciary." JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 19 (1974); see also MAX BOOT,
OUT OF ORDER (1998); WILLIAM THOMAS BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? (1971).
11. See American Judicature Society, State Judicial Conduct Organizations Summary,
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth-conduct-orgs.asp; see also MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C.
PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION, COMPENSATION, ETHICS, & DISCIPLINE (1987);
IRENE A. TESITOR & DWIGHT B. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1980).
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Part III summarizes Virginia's Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission, its constitutional mandate, statutory creation, ad-
ministrative process, and the judicial interpretations by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia. Part IV identifies challenges, both prac-
tical and constitutional, facing Virginia's Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission and offers suggestions for its improvement
with particular emphasis on judges' rights and the powers of the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. Part V concludes the
comment.
II. A HISTORY OF CHECKING THE JUDICIARY
Judicial integrity and independence thrives when a judge can
make decisions without fear of retribution from the other
branches of government via removal, censure, salary alterations,
or the like.12 Nevertheless, because human beings-subject to
human frailties-occupy every branch of government, America
has always provided for the removal of judges from the bench-
just as it has always provided for the removal of a President,
members of Congress, and other elected officials from office. With
respect to Virginia's judiciary, the election of judges serves as the
first line of defense against improper judicial conduct: the Gener-
al Assembly elects judges for a term, and they are subject to ree-
lection every twelve, eight, or six years. 13 Yet, judicial misconduct
in the interim may create the need to remove a judge from the
bench before his or her reelection. The Constitution of Virginia
provides for such a process via impeachment.14
The first Constitution of Virginia in 1776 provided for the im-
peachment of judges by the House of Delegates with a trial for
removal by the Court of Appeals.15 This impeachment process
was maintained in Virginia's 1830 constitution, but the trial of a
judge was moved to the Virginia Senate.16 Additionally, the new
constitution provided a second option for removing a judge from
the bench without conducting a trial where both houses of the
12. See generally W. Hamilton Bryson, Judicial Independence in Virginia, 38 U. RICH.
L. REV. 705 (2004).
13. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; see also Bryson, supra note 12, at 712 ('This system of
judicial selection provides a political check on the judiciary by the legislature.").
14. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 17.
15. VA. CONST. (1776).
16. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13 (1830).
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General Assembly approved such an action by a two-thirds vote. 17
This latter method was abolished in 1971 when the Constitution
of Virginia again changed, but impeachment by the House of Del-
egates with prosecution by a two-thirds vote of the Senate re-
mained. 18
Though the means of removing a judge by impeachment has
always existed in Virginia, the practice of doing so is rare. No
Virginia supreme court justice or court of appeals judge has ever
been impeached. 19 Also, although impeachment proceedings
against judges of Virginia's lower courts have been sporadically
initiated, only twice has such a proceeding been successful-once
in 1903, and again in 1908.20 The dearth of judicial impeach-
ments may mean one of two things: Virginia judges are some of
the most elite in the nation and strictly adhere to the judicial ca-
nons, or impeachment "is politically and procedurally cumber-
some."21 While Virginia certainly can opine as to her myriad pro-
fessional and perspicacious jurists, the latter is as likely to be
true because it is easier for the legislature to allow the few "un-
worthy or incompetent judge[s] to finish [their] term[s] of office
and then not re-elect" them. 22
The passage of House Bill 47523 in 1942 and its attempted ap-
plication in In re Carney24 illustrates an effort by the Virginia
legislature to circumvent the impeachment process-most likely
in response to its cumbersome requirements. Section five of
House Bill 475 granted the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
the power to conduct a hearing to determine whether a judge is
competent to remain in office.25 This power could be invoked only
after the court found reasonable cause to believe a judge suffered
from "an illness or disability, mental or physical,... render[ing]
such judge ... permanently incapacitated or incompetent to dis-
17. Id. art. V, § 6.
18. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 17.
19. Bryson, supra note 12, at 713.
20. Id. at 713-14.
21. Id. at 715.
22. Id.
23. H.B. 475, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1942) (enacted as Act of Apr. 6, 1942, ch.
441, 1942 Va. Acts 705).




charge the duties of his office."26 If the court found that the judge
was permanently unable to perform the duties of his office as a
result of the illness or disability, the court was required to retire
the judge. 27
The first application of House Bill 475 came in In re Carney.28
The House of Delegates passed House Resolution 30 requesting
the Supreme Court of Virginia to determine whether Judge A.B.
Carney should be retired under section five of House Bill 475.29
The court, however, noted that Resolution 30 did not allege that
Judge Carney suffered from an illness or disability, but rather it
accused him of malfeasance and misfeasance. 30 Such accusations,
the court held, were grounds for impeachment and did not invoke
the jurisdiction of section five in House Bill 475.31 The message
was clear: if the court was to have any power to remove a judge
from office, that power had to stem from the constitution or from
a statute enacted under the constitution. 32
The cumbersome process of impeachment no doubt forced the
House of Delegates to attempt to circumvent that system by pass-
ing House Resolution 30 to retire Judge Carney under House Bill
475. Indeed, after In re Carney the House tried to remove Judge
Carney by voting to impeach him for agreeing to share his salary
with his predecessor on the bench if the predecessor would re-
tire.33 Judge Carney, however, remained on the bench after the
Senate refused to remove him.34 As is evident from this series of
events, the process of impeachment consumes large quantities of
the General Assembly's time and resources. Furthermore, the
cumbersome nature of impeachment is exacerbated in Virginia,
perhaps more so than in other states, because the General As-
sembly meets for a limited duration each year. Within a short pe-
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 182 Va. at 908, 30 S.E.2d at 789.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 908-09, 30 S.E.2d at 789.
31. Id. at 909, 30 S.E.2d at 790.
32. See generally Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Power of Court to Remove or Sus-
pend Judge, 53 A.L.R.3d 882, § 4 (1973) ("[Any power existing in a state court to remove a
state judge from office must be based upon express constitutional provisions or upon valid
statutory enabling provisions enacted thereunder." (citing In re Carney, 182 Va. 907, 30
S.E.2d 789 (1944))).
33. Bryson, supra note 12, at 715.
34. Id.
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riod of time, the legislature tackles a voluminous amount of pub-
lic business-public business that would have to be set aside in
order to administer impeachment proceedings. Thus, impeach-
ment is an unsavory option the General Assembly has historical-
ly, and justifiably, avoided using.
The impeachment process exists today, although it is rarely
used. Instead, recognizing the hurdles that must be cleared to
remove a deficient judge or take corrective measures against a
misbehaving judge, the General Assembly included the estab-
lishment of the Jddicial Inquiry and Review Commission ("JIRC")
when it wrote Virginia's new constitution in 1971.35 Every other
state, including the District of Columbia, has created similar gov-
ernmental entities.36
III. OVERVIEW OF VIRGINIA'S JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND
REVIEW COMMISSION
The JIRC is Virginia's governmental body charged with "in-
vestigat[ing] charges that, if true, would warrant the retirement,
removal, or censure of a judge."37 The JIRC is provided for in the
Constitution of Virginia, given authority via statutory enactment
and acts pursuant to various administrative rules, and has had
its authority fleshed out by various judicial interpretations.
A. Constitutional Amendments
Article VI, section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia mandates
that the General Assembly create the JIRC and stipulates that its
membership shall consist of individuals from the judiciary, bar,
and public.38 In exercising the power to investigate charges
against judges, the JIRC is "authorized to conduct hearings and
to subpoena witnesses and documents."39 After its investigation,
the JIRC may file a complaint in the Supreme Court of Virginia
35. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
36. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
37. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 403, 563 S.E.2d 687,
688 (2002).
38. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (' he General Assembly shall create a Judicial Inquiry
and Review Commission .. ") (emphasis added).
39. Id. The specifics of how the JIRC is to carry out investigations are delineated by
the statute addressed infra III.B.
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against an accused judge if the charges are determined to be well-
founded.40 The supreme court has original jurisdiction in adjudi-
cating complaints filed by the JIRC for the censure, retirement,
or removal of a judge.41
Once a complaint is filed, the Supreme Court of Virginia must
conduct a hearing in open court.42 If the court finds a judge suf-
fers from a permanent disability that will seriously interfere with
his ability to perform his duties, the court must retire the judge
from office.43 The lone benefit a judge derives from this fate is
that his retirement benefits remain intact as if he voluntarily re-
tired.44 If, however, the court finds a judge either (1) "engaged in
misconduct while in office," (2) "persistently failed to perform the
duties of his office," or (3) "engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice," then the court must either cen-
sure or remove the judge from office.45 Additionally troublesome
to a judge removed in this manner is the forfeiture of his retire-
ment benefits.46
The constitutionally mandated division of power between the
JIRC and the supreme court-the former having investigative
powers only and the latter having adjudicative powers-is note-
worthy.47 This division of power, however, potentially would be
required by public policy and fundamental fairness even if the
constitution failed to divide the powers as it does.48 In In re Terry,
an Indiana judge challenged the state's supreme court and judi-
cial disciplinary commission's jurisdiction to remove him and to
investigate him.49 The court noted a constitutional provision sim-
ilar to Virginia's article VI, section 10, granting the court original
jurisdiction in disciplining, removing, or retiring a judge.50 Next,
the court stated that "the interest of the public in the efficient
40. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
41. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 ('The Supreme Court shall ... have original jurisdiction
... in matters of judicial censure, retirement, and removal under Section 10 of this ar-
ticle.").





47. This distinction is addressed infra in Part IV.C.
48. See In re Terry, 262 Ind. 667, 669-70 (1975).
49. See id. at 669.
50. See id. at 669-70.
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resolution of disciplinary matters, as well as requirements of fun-
damental fairness for the respondent, suggest the propriety of de-
legating those [investigatory] functions to an independent
body."51 Thus, even if Virginia failed to split the investigative and
adjudicative powers between the Supreme Court of Virginia and
the JIRC, public policy and fundamental fairness arguably would
require such a separation of powers.
B. Statutes
The General Assembly, adhering to article VI, section 10 of the
Constitution of Virginia, enacted Code sections 17.1-900 through -
919 to create and govern the JIRC. Specifically, section 17.1-901
"created a Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission" in the judi-
ciary branch of government and required that it be comprised of
seven members 52 who are selected by majority vote of the Gener-
al Assembly and will serve no more than two consecutive four-
year terms.53 The chairman and vice-chairman are elected an-
nually by the members of the JIRC.54
The statutory powers of the JIRC are outlined in title 17.1, be-
ginning with section 17.1-902. The first paragraph of that section
reiterates that the JIRC is an investigative body charged with the
duty of examining allegations of judicial misconduct that would
constitute a judge's retirement, censure, or removal. 55 The JIRC
is granted a host of powers to comply with this mandate, such as
conducting hearings, 56 employing officers or assistants, 57 hiring
51. Id. at 670. But see In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 529-31 (1976) (concluding that
there is no procedural due process requirement that investigatory and adjudicatory func-
tions must be separated between two decisionmakers, and citing twenty-four other states,
plus the District of Columbia, in accord).
52. JIRC membership is limited to three active members of the judiciary-one each
from a circuit, general district, and juvenile and domestic relations court, two active mem-
bers of the Virginia State Bar who have practiced for fifteen years or more, and two mem-
bers of the public who are not and never have been members of the judiciary or licensed
attorneys. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-901 (Cum. Supp. 2008). Further, JIRC members are com-
pensated and allowed "reasonable and necessary expenses incurred" while performing
their duties and are paid from the appropriations made to the JIRC. Id. § 17.1-904 (Cum.
Supp. 2008).
53. Id. § 17.1-901 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 17.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 17.1-903 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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experts and reporters, 58 providing for witnesses, 59 administering
oaths,60 requiring the inspection of books or records,61 issuing
subpoenas for witnesses or evidence,62 and ordering deposi-
tions.63 Further, entities, officers, and employees of the common-
wealth must cooperate with the JIRC by providing reasonable as-
sistance and information related to an investigation or proceeding
before the JIRC.64 During these investigations and proceedings,
Virginia's Attorney General, if asked, must act as counsel for the
JIRC.65 Finally, the JIRC may issue rules governing its investi-
gations and proceedings if those rules do not conflict with the
enabling statute or the constitution. 66
If the JIRC-after the filing of a complaint, an initial investiga-
tion by JIRC counsel determining whether the complaint has me-
rit, and a subsequent hearing further investigating meritorious
complaints-determines that the allegations of judicial miscon-
duct are "well-founded" and would warrant retirement, removal,
or censorship of the judge, then the JIRC may file a formal com-
plaint against the judge in the Supreme Court of Virginia. 67 Until
58. Id.
59. Id. As with witnesses in civil matters, witnesses before the JIRC are paid fees and
reimbursed for mileage. Id. § 17.1-915(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003). This reimbursement provision,
however, does not apply to officers or employees of Virginia. Id. § 17.1-915(B) (Repl. Vol.
2003).
60. Id. § 17.1-907 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
61. Id.
62. Id. Service of process issued to subpoena witnesses or the production of witnesses,
or to compel the inspection of books and records, supra note 61, is effective throughout
Virginia. Id. § 17.1-908 (Repl. Vol. 2003). Further, if a person refuses either to testify or
turn over evidence required by the subpoena, the JIRC may petition a court of record for
an order compelling the person to comply with the subpoena. Id. § 17.1-909 (Repl. Vol.
2003). That person must then explain to the court why he failed to comply with the sub-
poena; but, if the subpoena was regularly issued, the court must order the person to comp-
ly or be found in contempt of court. Id. Finally, sheriffs throughout Virginia must serve
process and administer lawful JIRC orders as requested without charge. Id. § 17.1-919
(Repl. Vol. 2003).
63. Id. § 17.1-910 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
64. Id. § 17.1-917 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
65. Id. § 17.1-903 (Repl. Vol. 2003). Nevertheless, in the four formal complaints where
the Supreme Court of Virginia has issued an opinion, the JIRC has not requested that the
Attorney General act as its counsel. Instead, the JIRC counsel has represented the JIRC
in each case. See Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 661, 651 S.E.2d
648, 650 (2007); Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 104, 630 S.E.2d
485, 487 (2006); Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 432, 611
S.E.2d 392, 393 (2005); Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 403, 568
S.E.2d 687, 688 (2002).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
67. Id. During the initial inestigation JIRC counsel will also decide ex parte whether
20081
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a formal complaint is filed in the Supreme Court of Virginia, all
investigations, proceedings, evidence, and testimony before the
JIRC is confidential.68 This duty of confidentiality applies to the
person who filed the complaint, those who are interviewed con-
cerning the complaint, and anyone who participates in the inves-
tigative or hearings process.69 A judge, however, may divulge in-
formation regarding the complaint to the extent necessary to
investigate the charges against him and prepare for hearings be-
fore the JIRC.70
The constitution does not require, however, that proceedings
before the JIRC and documents filed with the JIRC be kept confi-
dential.71 Instead, the General Assembly has discretion in deter-
mining the confidentiality of JIRC proceedings and documents. 72
Wisely, the General Assembly did implement such a confidential-
ity requirement.73 Initially, the statute-and the constitution-
prohibited all persons, whether directly involved with the pro-
ceedings or not, from divulging any information concerning the
investigation, proceedings, and evidence. 74 Further, any person
who violated this statute was guilty of a misdemeanor. 75 This
strict confidentiality requirement was challenged in the Supreme
to recommend suspending the judge under investigation. If JIRC counsel feels suspension
is warranted he will recommend suspension to the committee. The committee will then
decide ex parte whether to suspend the judge. If the committee agrees that suspension is
warranted the judge will be suspended and that judge will be notified when he is served
with the suspension.
68. Id. § 17.1-913(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008). Any record of proceedings not filed in the su-
preme court, along with the formal complaint, however, remain confidential and are kept
in the confidential files of the JIRC. Id.
69. Id. The one exception to the rule of confidentiality applies when a witness under
oath "willfully and intentionally testifie[s] falsely." Id. When the JIRC has reason to be-
lieve that a witness has done so, the JIRC chairman or one of its members may file a de-
tailed report with the Commonwealth Attorney in the city or county where the act oc-
curred for the prosecution of a perjury charge against the witness. Id.
70. Id.
71. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10 ("Proceedings and documents before the [JIRC] may be
confidential as provided by the General Assembly in general law.") (emphasis added).
72. See id.
73. For a discussion of confidentiality in JIRC proceedings, see Brian R. Pitney, Note,
Unlocking the Chamber Doors: Limiting Confidentiality in Proceedings Before the Virginia
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 367 (1992).
74. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (current version at VA. CODE ANN.




Court of the United States in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia.76
In Landmark, the Virginian-Pilot published an article accu-
rately reporting an ongoing investigation by the JIRC into alleged
judicial misconduct by a Virginia judge.77 Landmark Communi-
cations, Inc., owner of the Virginian-Pilot, was charged with vi-
olating Code section 2.1-37.13, found guilty, and fined $500.78 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the
question of whether section 2.1-37.13, as applied to "third persons
who are strangers to the [JIRC] inquiry," violated the First
Amendment. 79 In holding that the Virginia statute did violate the
First Amendment, the Court concluded that Virginia's interest in
protecting the judiciary was not sufficient to outweigh the in-
fringement of the media's rights under the First Amendment.80
Thus, those parties not involved in a judicial misconduct proceed-
ing are free to exercise their First Amendment rights in reporting
those proceedings, but the Court declined to address whether
Virginia could compel the silence of those involved in the JIRC
proceedings.S1
The Virginia General Assembly responded to the Landmark
decision by enacting Code section 2.1-37.13 (now section 17.1-
913),82 which passes constitutional muster by bringing only those
involved with the JIRC proceedings under the confidentiality
mandate.8 3 Additionally, any testimony given before and any
documents filed with the JIRC are privileged.8 4 Notwithstanding
the confidentiality and privilege requirements, the JIRC must
send all complaints and evidence regarding the alleged miscon-
76. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
77. Id. at 831.
78. Id. at 831-32.
79. Id. at 837.
80. Id. at 838, 841. "[N]either the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the reputa-
tion of its judges, nor its interest in maintaining the institutional integrity of its courts is
sufficient to justify the subsequent punishment of speech at issue here, even on the as-
sumption that criminal sanctions do in fact enhance the guarantee of confidentiality." Id.
at 841.
81. Id. at 837 ("We do not have before us any constitutional challenge to a State's
power to keep the [JIRC's] proceedings confidential or to punish participants for breach of
this mandate.") (emphasis added).
82. Act of Feb. 6, 1979, ch. 11, 1979 Va. Acts 11 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-913 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-913 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
84. Id. § 17.1-914 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
2008]
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duct of a judge to the designated District Committee of the Vir-
ginia State Bar.85 In addition, the JIRC must send the House and
Senate Committees for Courts of Justice, as well as any General
Assembly member upon request, all evidence regarding the al-
leged misconduct of a judge whose reelection will be addressed at
the next session of the General Assembly.86 Evidence transmitted
to the General Assembly under Code section 17.1-918 loses its
confidential status.8 7
The final piece of the JIRC statutory puzzle is its power over
judges when allegations of misconduct are made. The first of two
significant powers in this regard is the JIRC's ability to require a
judge to submit to mental and physical examinations when there
is probable cause to believe the judge is unable to perform his du-
ties because of alcohol or drug abuse, or because the judge is suf-
fering from a physical or mental illness.88 Prior to ordering an
exam, the JIRC must conduct a preliminary investigation via in-
formal conference and must hold a consultation with the judge.89
Further, the JIRC may require that the judge submit waivers al-
lowing the JIRC to obtain medical records, reports, and health
care information pertaining to the judge's physical and mental
condition.90 If a judge challenges his ordered exam, he may re-
quest a hearing and may call witnesses to testify on his behalf.91
If, however, the JIRC maintains its probable cause finding and
the judge fails to submit to the examination, a new charge of mis-
conduct will be filed against the judge for failing to comply with
the JIRC's orders.92
85. Id. § 17.1-918(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
86. Id. § 17.1-918(B) (Cum. Supp. 2008).
87. Id. The JIRC also must file an annual report with the General Assembly that in-
cludes: (1) the number of complaints filed; (2) how many of those complaints came from
attorneys, judges, court employees, or the public; (3) how many complaints were dismissed
based on the failure of the complaint to fall within the JIRC's jurisdiction or to state a vi-
olation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, or based on the failure of the JIRC to reach a
decision as to whether the Canons of Judicial Conduct were violated; (4) the number of
complaints where the JIRC found a violation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct; and (5)
how many times a JIRC member or employee recused themselves because of a conflict. Id.
§ 17.1-905 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-912(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 17.1-912(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
92. Id. § 17.1-912(C) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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The second, curious power of the JIRC-considering its grant of
investigative powers only93-is its power to summarily suspend a
judge upon a finding that the judge represents a substantial and
immediate threat to the public interest in the performance of the
judge's duties.94 This power over a judge after an allegation of
misconduct is made represents a departure from the purely inves-
tigative powers the JIRC normally maintains in the process. Nev-
ertheless, once the JIRC finds probable cause to believe Virginia
Code section 17.1-911(A) is satisfied, the JIRC may suspend a
judge with pay indefinitely.95 The only other requirements in-
cumbent upon the JIRC with respect to a suspension are: (1) rea-
sonable notice of the suspension to the judge as outlined by JIRC
rules; and (2) at the judge's request, arrangement of a hearing
during the first fifteen days of the suspension to ascertain
"whether justice would be served for the suspension to continue
until the completion of the investigation or formal hearing."96 Al-
though he may not exercise judicial powers during suspension, a
judge must still comply with the Canons of Judicial Conduct (the
"Canons").97
C. Administrative Rules
Like most administrative agencies, the JIRC has established a
series of rules with which investigations and hearings must
comply.9 8 There is, however, an exception allowing the waiver of
any rule when the interests of justice require a waiver and good
93. See Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 443-44, 611
S.E.2d 392, 400 (2005) (holding the Supreme Court of Virginia reviews JIRC decisions de
novo "because the [JIRC's] function is only to determine whether 'the charges are well-
founded, and sufficient to constitute the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a
judge."') (emphasis added).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-911(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 17.1-911(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
97. Id. § 17.1-911(C) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008). The Virginia Code does not
outline the logistical application of the summary suspension of a judge. Practical consider-
ations, such as what happens with the judge's docket, and how to explain the judge's ab-
sence, are not addressed either. This ambiguity has caused the media to take note when a
judge is missing from the bench. See Michelle Washington, No Explanation Yet on 3-
Month Absence of Judge, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 16, 2008, at B2 [hereinafter Washington,
No Explanation Yet on 3-Month Absence of Judge]. One may assume that the court's other
judges or a substitute judge would fill in for a suspended judge, and queries about his ab-
sence would be met with silence, but no official procedure is mandated.
98. Va. Judicial Inquiry & Review R. I(A).
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cause is shown.99 The administrative crux of these rules is found
in Rule 3, which outlines the procedures for handling com-
plaints.100
Initially, all complaints are filed in the JIRC's Richmond office
and the JIRC's attorney ("counsel") acknowledges receipt of the
complaint with the complainant.101 Counsel operates as the first
line of defense against frivolous allegations of judicial misconduct
by disposing of complaints that fail to state a violation of the Ca-
nons. 102 Complaints that counsel believes do allege a violation of
the Canons are given to the JIRC for inquiry.103 Next, counsel
conducts a preliminary investigation and presents his findings to
the JIRC.104 The JIRC dismisses complaints lacking merit and
counsel notifies the complainant. 105 Meritorious complaints are
identified as a "charge," the JIRC holds an informal conferencel06
with the judge named in the complaint, and further investigation
begins if needed.107 If, after this investigation, the JIRC deter-
mines a charge is "well-founded,"108 a formal hearing will be
99. Id. R. (C).
100. Id. R. 3.
101. Id. R. 3(A)(1)-(2).
102. See id. R. 3(A)(3).
103. Id. R. 3(A)(4).
104. Id. R. 3(A)(5).
105. Id. R. 3(A)(5)-(6). The JIRC may terminate a charge at any point where the com-
mission determines that the complaint is without merit or is insufficient to serve as the
basis for the judge's retirement, censure, or removal. Id. R. 3(D)(1). When it terminates a
complaint, the JIRC must issue a signed order and send a copy to the accused judge if the
judge is aware of the complaint. Id. R. 3(D)(2). The order must state whether the charge
was well-founded and whether it was sufficient to warrant the judge's retirement, censure,
or removal. Id. R. 3(D)(3). The order must outline action taken by the JIRC, including, if
the judge permits the disclosure, whether a supervision agreement was reached with the
judge as a condition of the complaint's termination. Id. R. 3(D)(3)-(4). The complainant
must be notified when a charge is terminated. Id. R. 3(D)(5).
106. An informal conference consists of a meeting between the judge and the JIRC to
informally discuss the alleged misconduct and possible solutions. Id. R. 4. The judge may
obtain an attorney to represent him at the conference, but no witnesses may testify. Id. If
the matter is not resolved during the informal conference, the JIRC either may terminate
the complaint or may proceed with a formal proceeding. Id. The informal conference, how-
ever, is not required, and the JIRC rules do not apply to such conferences. Id.
107. Id. R. 3(B)(1).
108. A "well-founded" complaint means "that the [JIRC] has found based upon clear
and convincing evidence and supported by facts and sound judgment that the misconduct
has occurred." Id. R. 2(M).
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gin;109 charges not meeting this criteria are disposed of according
to Rule 15.110
Prior to a formal hearing, several preliminary matters are ad-
dressed, such as a prehearing conference, that conference's order,
party motions, and discovery.Ill Although rarely done, a prehear-
ing conference may be conducted, upon either counsel or the
judge's motion, to consider (1) the simplification of the issues; (2)
the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (3)
the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof; (4) the limitation of the num-
ber of witnesses; (5) lists of witnesses; (6) stipulations of evidence;
(7) admissibility of evidence; (8) any preliminary motion filed; (9)
any other procedural matter, which will expedite the hearing
process.1 1 2
The JIRC will then enter a conference order summarizing what
occurred at the prehearing conference and any agreements or rul-
ings made; such order will govern the remainder of the action.11 3
Discovery rules require counsel to offer to meet with the judge's
attorney.11 4 If the judge's attorney requests the meeting, counsel
will outline the JIRC's case, give a synopsis of each witness's tes-
timony, and provide copies of all evidence that counsel plans to
present at the hearing.11 5 Any subsequent evidence or testimony
that counsel decides to offer at the hearing "will be disclosed
promptly to the judge's attorney."116 Finally, all preliminary mo-
tions must be filed at least fourteen days before the formal hear-
ing or prehearing conference, whichever occurs first.117
Formal hearings are governed by Rule 13 and represent the fi-
nal opportunity for the JIRC to dismiss a complaint until a formal
charge is made with the Supreme Court of Virginia. 118 Similar to
109. Id. R. 3(B)(2).
110. Id. R. 3(B)(3).
111. Id. R. 11. Rule 11 was amended February 14, 2006 after the Elliott decision to re-
spond to the due process concerns raised in that case.
112. Id. R. 11(B).
113. Id. R. 11(C). "The official transcript.., of the prehearing conference may serve as
the order to the extent that it includes rulings and agreements on material questions
raised at the prehearing conference." Id.
114. Id. R. 11(D).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. R. 11(A).
118. See id. R. 13.
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civil and criminal matters, the alleging party-JIRC counsel-
presents his case-in-chief against the judge first, and the judge
presents his defense second.119 Both parties may present evi-
dence, including exhibits,120 and, although relevancy rules of evi-
dence apply, "[h]earsay is admissible so long as it is material, re-
levant, and probative."121 Further, parties may make evidentiary
objections in the same manner as in civil or criminal trials, or in
writing before the formal hearing begins.122 Finally, an official
reporter must transcribe all formal hearings. 123
When all investigations, informal conferences, and formal hear-
ings have been completed, the JIRC may take one of four courses
of action.1 24 First, the JIRC may dismiss the charges.125 Second,
if the JIRC determines the charges are well-founded and warrant
the retirement, censure, or removal of the accused judge, the
JIRC "shall file a complaint against the judge in the Supreme
Court of Virginia."126 Third, if the charges are well-founded, but
do not warrant the retirement, censure, or removal of the accused
judge, then the JIRC will advise the judge of its findings and
dismiss the complaint.127 The dismissed charges, however, re-
main on file and will be considered if the judge is again charged
with misconduct.128 Fourth, if the charges are well-founded, the
judge and JIRC may enter a supervision agreement in lieu of the
filing of a formal charge with the Supreme Court of Virginia.129 If
the judge fails to adhere to the supervision agreement, such viola-
tion will warrant a new charge of judicial misconduct.130 Finally,
the JIRC must send all findings and its final order to the General
119. Id. R. 13(A). A judge's presence is required during a formal hearing, unless the
JIRC excuses his appearance. Id.
120. Id. R. 13(D).
121. Id. R. 13(B).
122. Id. R. 13(C).
123. Id. R. 13(G).
124. Id. R. 15(A). If the judge consents, however, the JIRC may take any of the four
actions following just the informal conference. Id. R. 15(B).
125. Id. R. 15(A)(1).
126. Id. R. 15(A)(2).
127. Id. R. 15(A)(3).
128. Id.




Assembly and the judge if the charges are well-founded and dis-
posed of under either Rule 15(A)(2), (3), or (4).131
The disposition of charges under Rules 15(A)(2) and (4) has
been a source of contention within the supreme court.1 32 The dis-
agreement concerns the variation of language between the per-
missive stance on filing a formal charge taken in the Constitution
of Virginia and in the statute,133 and the rigid standard requiring
the filing of a formal charge under certain conditions set forth in
the administrative rules.134 The inconsistency surfaced in Judi-
cial Inquiry & Review Commission v. Elliott, where the JIRC
found charges alleging Judge Elliott verbally threatened another
judge, distributed materials embarrassing and personally attack-
ing two more judges, yelled at a courtroom employee, practiced
improper courtroom tactics in drug cases, and made false repre-
sentations to the Chief Justice were found by the JIRC to be well-
founded.135 Instead of filing a formal complaint with the supreme
court as required by Rule 15(A)(2), however, the JIRC entered in-
to a supervision agreement under Rule 15(A)(4).136 When Judge
Elliott allegedly violated the supervision agreement, the JIRC
filed a formal charge against him in the supreme court. 137
The Elliott majority noted the inconsistent language between
the JIRC rule and the statutory and constitutional text but inter-
preted the former rigid rule as consistent with the latter permis-
sive language.138 The court did so by ignoring the plain meaning
and historical interpretation of the word "shall," concluding that
Rule 15(A)(2) is "necessarily permissive, rather than mandato-
131. Id. R. 15(A)(5).
132. See Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 104-06, 630 S.E.2d
485, 487-89 (2006).
133. The constitutional text states, "If the [JIRC] finds the charges to be well-founded,
it may file a formal complaint before the Supreme Court." VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (em-
phasis added). The statute states, "If the [JIRC] finds the charges to be well-founded, and
sufficient to constitute the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge, it may file
a formal complaint before the Supreme Court." VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2003
& Cum. Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
134. The rules of the JIRC state, "If the [JIRC] finds the charges against the judge to
be well founded and of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for retirement, censure or
removal, it shall file a complaint against the judge in the Supreme Court of Virginia." Va.
Judicial Inquiry & Review R. 15(A)(2) (emphasis added).
135. Elliott, 272 Va. at 105-06.
136. Id. at 107-08, 630 S.E.2d at 489.
137. Id. at 113, 630 S.E.2d at 493.
138. Id. at 118, 630 S.E.2d at 495-96.
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ry."13 9 The majority's argument states that because administra-
tive rules must be consistent with their enabling statute, and be-
cause supervision agreements are beneficial to accused judges,
the explicit and strict use of the word "shall" in Rule 15(A)(2)
must be equated with the permissive "may" in the Virginia Code
and Constitution of Virginia. 140 This reasoning, however, appears
to ignore the legal differences between the words "may" and
"shall."141
139. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 496.
140. See id.
141. A thorough discussion of the interpretation of "may" and "shall" is beyond the
scope of this article, but one issue deserves mention. The court has, at times, construed
"shall" as permissive rather than mandatory. See Huffman v. Kite, 198 Va. 196, 93 S.E.2d
328 (1956); Ladd v. Lamb, 195 Va. 1031, 81 S.E.2d 756 (1954). The court in Huffman ans-
wered the question of whether "shall," as used in a particular section of the Virginia Code,
was permissive or mandatory by looking at "the history of the act, its nature, subject mat-
ter and purpose, and the significance and importance of the provision . .. and then by
giving to the language used its ordinary and usually accepted meaning ...." 198 Va. at
198-99, 93 S.E.2d at 329-31. The statute in question stated that each county "shall" have
a school board that "shall be composed of' certain residents from the county and that any
vacancy "shall be filled" within thirty days of the vacancy occurring. Id. at 197, 93 S.E.2d
at 329 (emphasis added). The petitioner challenged that new members were appointed to
the Board after the thirty-day limit and, therefore, their appointments were invalid. Id. at
198, 93 S.E.2d at 330. Viewing "shall" as permissive, the court noted the "rule is where a
statute specifies a time within which a public officer is to perform an act regarding the
rights and duties of others, it will be considered as merely directory, unless the nature of
the act to be performed or the language shows that the designation of time was intended
as a limitation of power." Id. at 200, 93 S.E.2d at 331 (emphasis added). Lamb is in accord:
the court held the clerk of the court's failure to forward a certified copy of a conviction to
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles within a specified time period as required by the word
"shall" in the statute did not render the conviction invalid. 195 Va. at 1035, 91 S.E.2d 758-
59. A statute prescribing such time limits is "directory unless it denies the exercise of the
power after such time." Id. As recently as 2002, the court held
while the word "shall" is primarily mandatory in effect, and "may" is primari-
ly permissive in effect, "courts, in endeavoring to arrive at the meaning of
written language, whether used in a will, a contract, or a statute, will con-
strue "may" and "shall" as permissive or mandatory in accordance with the
subject matter and context.
TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Virginia, L.L.C., 263 Va. 116, 121, 557 S.E.2d 199,
201 (2002) (citing Pettus v. Hendricks, 113 Va. 326, 330, 74 S.E. 191, 193 (1912)).
The court in both Huffman and Lamb interpreted "shall" in the context of time con-
straints in which an act was to be performed, not in the context of whether the act must be
performed. Had it addressed whether a board must be appointed or whether the clerk of
the court must send a certified copy of a conviction to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
the court undoubtedly would have found "shall" mandatory in requiring the act's perfor-
mance. The court's holding in TM Delmarva Power supports this proposition, as a corol-
lary statute in Lamb mandated that failure to send the certified copy was a misdemeanor.
Lamb, 195 Va. at 1035, 91 S.E.2d at 759.
When Rule 15(a)(2) is put in context and when one examines Rule 15's subject matter,
the dissent's view of the word "shall" in Elliott appears to be the correct interpretation.
Rule 15(a)(2) states when charges against a judge are "well founded and of sufficient gravi-
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The Elliott dissent identified the problem with the majority's
holding.142 Rule 15(A)(2) states that a well-founded complaint,
warranting retirement, removal, or censure, shall result in the
filing of a complaint with the supreme court.143 The provision is
"mandatory, not discretionary" and holding otherwise "renders
the use of 'shall' meaningless."144 The dissent's interpretation of
Rule 15(A)(2) would render Rule 15(A)(4) meaningless, and this
point was acknowledged by noting that although agencies are
usually granted the power to issue rules, such power is limited by
the agency's enabling statute.1 45 With respect to the JIRC, the
Constitution of Virginia and Virginia Code section 17.1-902 au-
thorize the JIRC to take only one course of action when a com-
plaint is well-founded: the JIRC "may file a formal complaint be-
fore the Supreme Court."146 Further, Code section 17.1-902
authorizes the creation of rules, but limits the scope of such rules
to the administration of investigations and hearings only.147
Thus, the JIRC has no authority to implement Rule 15(A)(4) or to
enter into and enforce supervision agreements.1 48 This sound
reasoning only garnered three of the seven Justices votes, thus,
ty to constitute the basis for retirement, censure or removal," the JIRC "shall" file a com-
plaint. Va. Judicial Inquiry & Review R. 15(a)(2) (emphasis added). Such language, read in
context, evidences the drafters' concern for the judiciary's integrity-a subject matter of
utmost importance. The drafters of the rule saw the filing of a complaint with the supreme
court as the only appropriate remedy, as the court is the only entity vested with power to
retire, censure, or remove a judge. To add additional context, a Commonwealth's Attorney
has authority to file complaints with the judiciary against individuals under a statute that
says, "An information may be filed by the attorney for the Commonwealth ...." VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-217 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (emphasis added). Comparing the use of "may" with re-
gard to the Commonwealth's Attorney, and "shall" with regard to the JIRC puts the use of
the terms in context and supports the proposition that the use of "shall" in Rule 15(A)(2) is
mandatory, not permissive.
142. Elliott, 272 Va. at 124, 630 S.E.2d at 499 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 124-25, 630 S.E.2d at 499.
144. Id. at 125, 630 S.E.2d at 499-500.
145. Id. at 126, 630 S.E.2d at 500.
146. Id. at 125, 630 S.E.2d at 500.
147. Id. at 126, 630 S.E.2d at 500.
148. Id. at 126-27, 630 S.E.2d at 500-01. Justice Keenan used the example of occupa-
tional regulatory boards, such as the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board and the Board
of Medicine, which are authorized to not only investigate, but also dispose of "charges by
imposing license suspension, probation with or without terms, reprimands, and in some
cases financial penalties." Id. at 126, 630 S.E.2d at 500 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 541-2706,
-2915, -3007, -3316, -4413 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2008)). This same authorization,
however, is not present in the enabling statute of the JIRC. Id.
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leaving in place the JIRC's ability to dispose of well-founded com-
plaints by entering into supervision agreements. 149
The remaining JIRC rules address the more mundane proce-
dural aspects of pleadings, service of process, subpoenas, and file
retention. Rule 6 requires that all pleadings properly identify the
case, state the facts and relief sought, and be signed by the judge
and his attorney.150 Further, upon receiving notice of a JIRC
hearing, a judge must file an answer, the requirements of which
are substantially similar to those in civil proceedings.151 The
JIRC must serve a notice of hearing on the accused judge as out-
lined in Rule 8, which requires the notice be personally served on
the judge and all subsequent documents be served on the judge's
attorney.152 Any service made upon the JIRC must be served to
counsel.153 Rule 8 uniquely requires that the judge be served at
his home to ensure confidentiality. 154 If the judge cannot be found
at home, service may be made wherever the judge can be
found.155 The time for filing pleadings, answers, service, and con-
ducting JIRC hearings may be extended at the JIRC's discre-
tion-although "motions to continue hearings are regarded with
disfavor."156 An application for a subpoena must "be made at
least fourteen days (14) before [a] hearing" and must be granted if
the application complies with the JIRC Rules.157 A judge may
nevertheless waive a procedural rule in a writing signed by the
judge, his attorney, and counsel, unless a hearing has begun, at
which point waivers may be stated on the record.15 8
Finally, reaffirming the curious statutory power of summarily
suspending a judge, Rule 3(C) provides for a judge's suspension
with pay in accordance with Virginia Code section 17.1-911.159 In
addition, Rule 3 reiterates the JIRC's ability to procure a physical
149. Id. at 124, 630 S.E.2d at 499.
150. Va. Judicial Inquiry & Review R. 6(A)-(B).
151. Id. R. 6(C). The judge must file his answer within twenty-one days from the date
of service; in the answer the judge must state the nature of the defense, admit or deny
specific allegations in the Notice of Hearing, and outline affirmative defenses. Id.
152. Id. R. 8(A).
153. Id.
154. Id. R. 8(B).
155. Id.
156. Id. R. 10(B).
157. Id. R. 12.
158. Id. R. 14.
159. Id. R. 3(C)(1).
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or mental exam of a judge.160 Such an examination is contingent
upon the JIRC finding "probable cause to believe that a judge is
unable to perform his duties because of excessive use of alcohol or
drugs or physical or mental illness."161 The provision of Rule 3(C)
pertaining to procurement of an examination of a judge certainly
maintains the integrity of the JIRC's constitutional mandate of
investigating allegations of judicial misconduct, but the portion of
the rule providing for a judge's suspension-as mentioned
above16 2 and discussed later163-raises questions of a usurpation
of powers.
D. Judicial Interpretation
The judiciary has also acted as a significant arbitrator of the
bounds of the JIRC's power. Nevertheless, the supreme court has
handed down relatively few decisions that address formal com-
plaints filed against judges. Counsel's role as gatekeeper for com-
plaints and the JIRC's investigative process are the main reasons
for this result; "almost seventy-five percent of all complainants
base[ ] their complaints on meritless allegations."164 The remain-
ing meritorious complaints are likely disposed of under Rule
15(A)(4), as a judge would rather agree to confidential supervision
or resign than face public scrutiny for his malfeasance. The few
cases that remain, however, provide valuable guidance as to the
scope of the JIRC's power.
1. The Supreme Court of Virginia's Standard of Review
The first published opinion in a judicial discipline case since
the JIRC's creation in 1971 came in 2002 with Judicial Inquiry &
Review Commission v. Lewis.165 Judge Lewis, a juvenile and do-
mestic relations judge, entered a custody order "requiring Albert
Valery to surrender custody of his two children to their mother no
later than 3:00 p.m." that date.166 Mr. Valery failed to surrender
the children at 3:00 p.m., and instead sought review from the cir-
160. Id. R. 3(C)(2).
161. Id.
162. See supra Part III.B.
163. See infra Part V.A.
164. See Pitney, supra note 73, at 373.
165. 264 Va. 401, 568 S.E.2d 687 (2002).
166. Id. at 403, 568 S.E.2d at 688.
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cuit court at 4:00 p.m. 16 7 The circuit court stayed Judge Lewis's
order until a hearing could be held two days later on October 5th,
but on October 4th the juvenile court issued a criminal show
cause summons against Mr. Valery to explain why he did not
comply with Judge Lewis's order.168 At the show cause hearing,
Mr. Valery's counsel advised Judge Lewis of the circuit court's
stay order, yet Judge Lewis found Mr. Valery in contempt for fail-
ing to turn over his children and sentenced him to ten days in jail
without bond unless he complied with the judge's earlier order. 169
A complaint was filed with the JIRC against Judge Lewis and af-
ter an investigation, the JIRC filed a formal complaint with the
supreme court alleging Judge Lewis violated several Canons.170
The crux of the Lewis opinion is in the court's departure from
affording administrative agencies deference to the agencies' evi-
dentiary and factual findings.171 Instead, in Lewis, the court
wisely decided to consider all determinations of fact de novo
based on the evidence presented. 172 Additionally, the court found
the JIRC "must prove its charges ... by clear and convincing evi-
dence." 173 With this standard in place, the court determined
Judge Lewis violated the Canons by requiring Mr. Valery to
comply with his order when he had knowledge of the circuit
court's stay. 174 The court then censured Judge Lewis "for engag-
ing in 'conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of jus-
tice."'175
2. Standard of Review Expanded and Errors of Law
In Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. Peatross the su-
preme court clarified its holding in Lewis and outlined the stan-
dard for what constitutes judicial misconduct.17 6 Judge Peatross




171. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4027 (Cum. Supp. 2007 & Supp. 2008); see also Vuyyuru
v. Va. Bd. of Med., No. 0610-07-2, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 30, *4 (Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2008) (un-
published decision) ("In reviewing an agency decision, we give deference to an ad-
ministrative agency's factual determination...").
172. Lewis, 264 Va. at 405, 568 S.E.2d at 689.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 406, 568 S.E.2d at 689-90.
175. Id. at 407, 568 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10).
176. 269 Va. 428, 611 S.E.2d 392 (2005).
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allegedly partook in several acts in various cases that violated the
Canons, including: (1) nolle prosequing a criminal charge sua
sponte, (2) acting in an uncivil manner towards attorneys, (3) es-
tablishing a policy of refusing to hear misdemeanor cases unless
in conjunction with a felony charge, (4) misrepresenting in a plea
agreement that he did not take part in plea negotiations, (5) es-
tablishing a policy of encouraging his previewing of all plea
agreements, (6) engaging in ex parte communications with a de-
fendant, (7) removing the Commonwealth Attorney and Public
Defender from a case "vindictively and in retaliation," (8) engag-
ing in ex parte communications with the Chief Justice regarding
the JIRC complaint, and (9) misrepresenting to the Chief Justice
that his case would not come before the supreme court. 177 Judge
Peatross opted to adhere to a supervision agreement in lieu of
having formal charges filed against him, but when conditions that
he had not discussed orally with the JIRC were included in the
agreement, Judge Peatross decided not to enter into the agree-
ment and the JIRC filed a formal complaint against him.178
The court immediately rejected the JIRC's contention that "due
weight" be given to the JIRC's findings and credibility determina-
tions.1 79 Citing Lewis, the court held that it would review the
evidence and JIRC conclusions de novo. 180 The thrust behind the
court's rationale is that the JIRC's purpose is to perform only two
tasks: (1) decide whether charges levied against a judge are well-
founded, and (2) if so, determine whether those charges warrant
the retirement, censure, or removal of that judge.181 If the JIRC
answers both of these questions affirmatively and then files a
formal complaint, the supreme court's original jurisdiction is in-
voked.182 It is the court's duty to take adjudicative action against
the accused judge. 183
177. Id. at 433-42, 611 S.E.2d at 394-99.
178. Id. at 442, 611 S.E.2d at 399.
179. Id. at 443-44, 611 S.E.2d at 400.
180. Id. at 443, 611 S.E.2d at 400.
181. Id. at 444, 611 S.E.2d at 400.
182. See id.
183. See id. Interestingly, the court went on to note that if it finds clear and convincing
evidence that a complaint is valid then it must censure or remove the judge from office. Id.
The court then cited the language in article VI, section ten of the Constitution of Virginia,
see id., which states the court "shall censure him or shall remove him from office." VA.
CONST. art. VI, § 10 (emphasis added). This conclusion directly contradicts the court's de-
cision in Lewis that the word "shall" in the JIRC's rules is permissive. See supra notes
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Applying these principles to Judge Peatross's case and review-
ing evidence presented de novo, the court found the evidence in-
sufficient to warrant the censure, removal, or retirement of Judge
Peatross.184 Audio recordings of the court proceedings in question
revealed Judge Peatross displayed a "stern, direct, and authorita-
tive" demeanor towards attorneys, but not an 'uncivil' or 'ex-
tremely impatient, undignified and discourteous"' one.1 8 5 Also,
the court found, the JIRC presented insufficient evidence to sup-
port a credibility finding against Judge Peatross with regard to
either his representations and policies concerning plea agree-
ments, or his communications with the Chief Justice. 186 Most im-
portantly, the court noted, the remaining allegations against
Judge Peatross represented, at most, mere errors of law, which,
without more, cannot sustain a violation of the Canons.18 7 A rule
protecting judges from punishment for committing errors of law is
essential to protect the judiciary's independence. 188
3. Due Process Rights of Judges, Adherence to Administrative
Rules, and Procedural Safeguards
One of the supreme court's most significant decisions in terms
of establishing judges' rights came in Judicial Inquiry & Review
Commission v. Elliott.189 The JIRC filed a complaint against
Judge Elliott for allegedly violating the Canons on twelve sepa-
rate occasions.190 After determining that seven of the twelve inci-
dents were well-founded, the JIRC offered Judge Elliott a super-
vision agreement in exchange for not filing a formal complaint
against him.191 The supervision agreement required that Judge
Elliott (1) retire from the bench no later than June 30, 2006; (2)
write apology letters-approved by the JIRC-to all judges he
verbally assaulted; (3) discontinue his practices of (a) claiming to
have a "DEA light" that could detect when a drug defendant was
132-48 and accompanying text.
184. Peatross, 269 Va. at 449-50, 611 S.E.2d at 403-04.
185. Id. at 445, 611 S.E.2d at 401. The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the audio
recordings relied on by the JIRC "do not even remotely provide clear and convincing evi-
dence of a violation of the Canons." Id.
186. Id. at 445-46, 449, 611 S.E.2d at 401, 403.
187. Id. at 447, 611 S.E.2d at 402.
188. Id.
189. 272 Va. 97, 630 S.E.2d 485 (2006).
190. Id. at 105, 630 S.E.2d at 488.
191. Id. at 105-06, 630 S.E.2d at 488-89; see also supra note 135 and accompanying
text for an explanation of acts giving rise to judicial misconduct.
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lying, (b) reviewing criminal records prior to hearing evidence,
and (c) holding himself out as an expert on ethics; and (4) submit
to supervision by a judge of the JJRC's choosing.192 Also, under
the agreement, although Judge Elliott could announce that he
was returning to the bench, he could not say or imply to anyone
except family and his attorney that he was "vindicated" by the
JIRC. 193
After Judge Elliott executed the agreement, the JIRC asked
the Judge and his attorney to appear before the Commission to
discuss allegations that the Judge violated the supervision
agreement. 194 The two incidents to which the JIRC referred were:
(1) in response to his bailiff inquiring how the proceedings went,
Judge Elliott stated, "'I can't say specifically ... but everything is
going to be okay"'; and (2) in response to an attorney asking the
same question at church, Judge Elliott replied, "'[E]verything will
be all right, everything is fine."'195 The JIRC decided these com-
ments were statements of vindication and thereafter rescinded
the original supervision agreement and agreed not to file a formal
complaint if a new agreement was reached that moved Judge El-
liott's retirement date up six months. 196 The Judge declined this
offer and therefore the JIRC filed a formal complaint against him
in the supreme court asking for his censure or removal. 197
The court began its analysis by recognizing that a balance
must be maintained between "protecting the integrity of the judi-
ciary and the rights of individual judges."198 Procedural due
process rights require that the JIRC "employ adequate procedural
safeguards to prevent arbitrary deprivation of the rights and
property interests of a judge."199 Thus, the court concluded that a
judge has "vested property rights" in his position as judge and a
constitutional right to protect his 'good name, reputation, honor,
or integrity."' 200 The existence of these rights requires that the
192. Elliott, 272 Va. at 107, 630 S.E.2d at 489.
193. Id. at 108, 630 S.E.2d at 489.
194. Id. at 111, 630 S.E.2d at 491.
195. Id. at 112, 630 S.E.2d at 492.
196. Id. at 112-13, 630 S.E.2d at 492.
197. Id. at 113-14, 630 S.E.2d at 493.
198. Id. at 114, 630 S.E.2d at 493 (emphasis added).
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). See generally
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *36 (stating that those in public office acquire a
property right in that office and are restricted only in their ability to transfer that proper-
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JIRC afford judges the same entitlements any other citizen rece-
ives from the government. 201 The court's holding marked a dra-
matic, but correct, shift from the rule in several states that be-
cause judges have no vested property rights in their positions as
judges, judges have no due process rights in the context of pro-
ceedings involving judicial misconduct. 202
With due process rights established, the court emphasized that
once an administrative agency implements rules, the agency can-
not violate those rules. 203 Additionally, administrative rules must
comply with the agency's enabling statute and the principles of
due process. 204 If, however, the agency does violate its rules and
prejudice results, the agency's actions must be reversed.205 Thus,
once the JIRC and a judge enter into a supervision agreement,
the JIRC must adhere to the agreement unless it can establish
that the judge breached the agreement. 206 Whether or not a su-
pervision agreement was in fact reached is a question of the law
of contracts. 207 In Elliott, the court found that the JIRC and
Judge Elliott did enter into a supervision agreement, but that the
JIRC failed to establish that Judge Elliott violated the agree-
ment, and therefore the agency improperly revoked the agree-
ment; thus, the JIRC's formal complaint was not properly before
the supreme court and warranted dismissal. 208
4. The Supreme Court's Departure from Elliott's Due Process
Holding
In the thirty years following the JIRC's creation in 1971, the
Supreme Court of Virginia did not publish a single opinion re-
garding a complaint filed by the JIRC.209 Judicial Inquiry & Re-
ty right to others).
201. Elliott, 272 Va. at 114, 630 S.E.2d at 493.
202. See, e.g., Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132, 1136-37 (E.D. Mich. 1976);
In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 734 (Mich. 1977); O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 768 (Mo.
1978); see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, State Judicial Conduct Organizations, 76 KY. L.J. 811,
838 (1988). For a discussion of why Virginia's rule is more constitutionally sound, see infra
Part IV.A.
203. Elliott, 272 Va. at 115, 630 S.E.2d at 494.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 119, 630 S.E.2d at 496.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 123, 630 S.E.2d at 498-99.
209. Alan Cooper, JIRC Becoming a Regular Litigant Before High Court, VA. LAW.
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view Commission v. Shull, however, marked the fourth published
opinion by the court in the past five years. 210 Judge Shull alleged-
ly (1) required a woman to proceed in a custody dispute without
representation; (2) forced her to remove her pants twice to prove
the existence of a disputed wound; (3) engaged in ex parte com-
munications; and (4), in another case, decided a visitation dispute
by flipping a coin. 211 The JIRC suspended Judge Shull after it
was made aware of the above allegations. 212 The judge requested
a section 17.1-911(B) hearing to determine whether 'justice
would be served"' by continuing his suspension and he asked to
cross-examine witnesses who provided evidence supporting the
suspension. 2i3 The JIRC granted his request for a hearing, but
denied his request to cross-examine witnesses.214 The JIRC also
required that Judge Shull bear the burden of proof to show justice
would not be served by his continued suspension. 215 At the hear-
ing's conclusion the JIRC held that Judge Shull should remain
suspended.2 i6 Additionally, the JIRC concluded the charges filed
against him were well-founded and significant enough to warrant
his retirement, censure, or removal; thus, the JIRC filed a formal
complaint with the supreme court. 217
At the supreme court hearing, Judge Shull argued the JIRC vi-
olated his due process rights when it shifted the burden of proof
at the suspension hearing and denied him the right to cross-
examine witnesses. 21 8 The court did not reach the merits of his
argument, however, because it concluded that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over the issues.219 In reaching its decision, the court stated:
Our jurisdiction over the formal charges filed in this Court is purely
original in nature. The [JIRC], not this Court, is vested with the sta-
tutory authority to determine whether a judge should be suspended
WKLY, Nov. 19, 2007, at 1.
210. See 274 Va. 657, 651 S.E.2d 648 (2007); Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 630 S.E.2d 485; Judi-
cial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 611 S.E.2d 392 (2005); Judicial
Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 568 S.E.2d 687 (2002).
211. Shull, 274 Va. at 662-63, 651 S.E.2d at 651-52.
212. Id. at 662, 651 S.E.2d at 651.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 662, 671, 651 S.E.2d at 651, 656.
215. See id. at 671, 651 S.E.2d at 656.
216. Id. at 663, 651 S.E.2d at 651.
217. Id. at 668, 651 S.E.2d at 654-55.
218. Id. at 671, 651 S.E.2d at 656.
219. Id.
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with pay until resolution of a pending investigation. Moreover, nei-
ther the Constitution nor the Code has given this Court authority to
review the [JIRC's] suspension hearing procedures or the [JIRC's]
decision to suspend a judge with pay until final resolution of pending
charges. In the absence of constitutional or statutory authority to do
so, we are not at liberty to presume such authority.
... Judge Shull asks, in the form of a due process challenge, that
we address matters over which we have not been given constitution-
al or statutory authority. In the absence of such authority, Judge
Shull's due process challenge effectively requests an advisory opinion
concerning matters not subject to our review.2 20
In summary, the court held two things: (1) neither the Consti-
tution of Virginia nor the legislature gave the court power to rule
on a constitutional due process claim, 22 1 and (2) Judge Shull
twice disregarded the dignity of litigants and the judicial process
and therefore should be removed from office.222
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Although Virginia's system for handling cases of judicial mis-
conduct is probably one of the better in the country, it is not flaw-
less. Three areas in particular need refinement: (1) judges' due
process rights, (2) the rules providing for the creation of supervi-
sion agreements, and (3) the JIRC's ability to suspend judges.
A. Due Process
The issue surrounding due process, judges, and JIRC proceed-
ings stems from a jurisdictional question hinging on constitution-
al interpretation. The supreme court started down the right path
in Elliott when it found the court had jurisdiction to determine
that the JIRC must "employ adequate procedural safeguards" to
protect judges' due process rights.223 The court regressed in
Shull, however, when it held that it has no jurisdiction to hear
procedural due process claims during a JIRC proceeding without
220. Id. at 671-72, 651 S.E.2d at 656-57 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 672, 651 S.E.2d at 656-57.
222. Id. at 676-77, 651 S.E.2d at 659-60.




an express grant from the Constitution of Virginia or the Virginia
Code.224 Thus, the heart of the matter regarding judges' proce-
dural due process rights in JIRC proceedings comes down to a
single question: Does the Constitution of Virginia or Virginia
Code grant the supreme court jurisdiction to hear due process
complaints with regard to the JIRC's preliminary procedures?
To conclude that the supreme court has jurisdiction to hear
judges' procedural due process complaints with regard to JIRC
proceedings, one must begin with the assumption that, if not for
article VI, section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia providing for
the creation of the JIRC, the General Assembly would have no
power to create the JIRC on its own accord.225 Prior to the JIRC's
creation a judge could be removed from office only by impeach-
ment.226 Establishing just a single course of action for removing a
judge necessarily ensured the separation of powers among Virgin-
ia's three governmental branches. 227 Further, although typically
the General Assembly may take any action not prohibited by the
constitution, the notion of separation of powers and the construc-
tion of only one vehicle-impeachment-for removing a judge
necessarily preclude the legislature from creating a new means
by which to remove judges.228 Thus, for the JIRC to exist the
Constitution of Virginia must permit its existence.
With this assumption established, one turns to the portion of
the constitution defining the scope of the supreme court's jurisdic-
tion to determine how broadly or narrowly that scope should be
read. Article VI, section 1 grants the court "original jurisdic-
tion.., in matters of judicial censure, retirement, and removal
under Section 10 of this Article."229 Section 10 grants the General
Assembly power to create the JIRC.230 Thus, there is no doubt
the constitution does in fact provide the supreme court with ju-
risdiction over at least some matters dealing with JIRC proceed-
ings. The question turns on whether this jurisdiction should be
read broadly to include all matters arising under article VI, sec-
224. Shull, 274 Va. at 671-72, 651 S.E.2d at 656-57.
225. See infra notes 317-31 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
227. "The legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct
.. " VA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
228. See infra notes 312-29 and accompanying text.
229. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
230. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
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tion 10-from the procedural beginning to the final adjudica-
tion-or only limited matters-from the filing of substantive
charges to the final adjudication.
The Elliott court seemed to find jurisdiction over preliminary
JIRC proceedings, adopting a broad interpretation of article VI,
section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia. 23 1 In Elliott, the court
addressed the actions of the JIRC prior to the filing of substantive
charges against a judge, holding that "[t]he procedural due
process requirements of the Constitution of Virginia compel the
[JIRC] ... [to] employ adequate procedural safeguards to prevent
the arbitrary deprivation of the rights and property interests of a
judge who stands accused of official misconduct." 232 Indeed, the
"great significance" of both the removal of a judge from office and
public confidence in the judiciary acts as the impetus for the
"faithful adherence to the law."233 Summary suspensions-
removing a judge from office and imperiling the judge's 'good
name, reputation, honor, [and] integrity"'234--deprive a judge of
his liberty and property interests. Thus, as the Elliott Court held,
the JIRC "must employ adequate procedural safeguards to pre-
vent the arbitrary deprivation" of a judge's rights in suspension
hearings. 235
To be sure, Judge Shull relied upon the language of the Elliott
court to illustrate that the supreme court had jurisdiction to hear
his due process complaint, but the court held otherwise.236 The
court viewed Elliott as dealing with substantive charges filed
against a judge and the final adjudication of those charges; the
court couched the Elliott decision as a narrow reading of the su-
231. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Elliott, 272 Va.
97, 114, 630 S.E.2d 485, 493 (2006).
232. Elliott, 272 Va. at 114-16, 630 S.E.2d at 493-94.
233. Id. at 114, 630 S.E.2d at 493.
234. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
235. Id. The Elliott Court held that "procedural due process requirements of the Con-
stitution of Virginia compel the [JIRC] . .. [to] employ adequate procedural safeguards to
prevent the arbitrary deprivation of the rights and property interests of a judge .... Id.
This holding must apply to summary suspensions because the JIRC's only means of de-
priving a judge of his "rights and property interests" in violation of procedural due process
is summary suspensions, as the JIRC is otherwise an investigative body only.




preme court's jurisdiction over matters arising under article VI,
section 10.237
If the court has jurisdiction over any preliminary matter it is
summary suspensions. Nothing in the JIRC's preliminary proce-
dures as easily falls under article VI, section l's grant of jurisdic-
tion to the supreme court over judicial removal: summary sus-
pensions are judicial removal. But, because the Shull court found
that the JIRC's suspension procedures were outside the court's
jurisdiction, and because no other preliminary procedure as easily
falls under the ambit of article VI, section 1, any act taken by the
JIRC, short of filing a formal charge in the supreme court or a fi-
nal resolution of those charges, is now outside the supreme
court's review.
The court's narrow jurisdictional holding in Shull is unfortu-
nate because it essentially leaves a judge whose rights have been
violated with two courses of action: (1) a section 1983 suit or (2) a
writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.
Compared to a broad interpretation under article VI, section 1 of
the supreme court's jurisdiction, neither option is preferable.
A section 1983 action allows a person to file suit against anoth-
er for deprivation of her constitutional rights "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State."238
Such a suit in federal court requires a plaintiff to show clearly
that she cannot raise her constitutional claim under state law. 239
A judge's due process claim in a JIRC suspension hearing likely
would meet this requirement given that the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Shull held that the court has no jurisdiction to hear
such claims. Nevertheless, even where a plaintiff is barred from
bringing a section 1983 suit in federal court, such actions may be
237. See id. at 671, 651 S.E.2d at 656.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
239. See Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 77 (2d Cir.
2003) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982)). The law virtually presumes a plaintiff is able to raise constitutional claims in
state court as the abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), gener-
ally requires that "any uncertainties as to the scope of state proceedings or the availability
of state remedies [be] resolved in favor of abstention." Id. at 77-78. Even the mere possi-
bility that a state court may or may not exercise discretion to hear a plaintiffs constitu-
tional claim is enough to invoke a Younger abstention. Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme
Court of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1995).
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filed in state court. 240 Whether filed in state or federal court,
however, a section 1983 suit is inadequate.
First, the filing of a section 1983 suit forces a judge to decide
between two rights: his right to confidentiality or his right to due
process. Judges have a right to confidentiality with regard to
JIRC investigations and proceedings. 241 Judges also have a right
to due process with regard to their liberty and property inter-
ests. 242 If a judge files a section 1983 suit to enforce his due
process rights, however, he loses his right to confidentiality be-
cause the section 1983 suit becomes part of the public record. On
the other hand, if a judge chooses to maintain his right to confi-
dentiality, he does so at the expense of enforcing his due process
rights.
Second, because a section 1983 suit is a federal remedy, it re-
quires that Virginia judges seek federal protection when the state
system they have promised to serve has declined to defend them
against violations of the very laws they have sworn to uphold.
Forcing judges to turn to federal law for help fosters a paternalis-
tic role for the federal government-a role Virginia should reject.
"Indeed, few interests can be considered more central than a
state's interest in regulating its own judicial system."243 The
principles of comity and federalism urge the alternative of a state
remedy in lieu of the federal section 1983 remedy. 244
The writ of mandamus is also unacceptable as an alternative to
the supreme court's exercise of jurisdiction over a judge's due
process claim. A writ of mandamus "is an extraordinary remedy
... issued only when there is a clear right to the relief sought, a
legal duty to perform the requested act, and no adequate remedy
at law."245 This remedy fails for two reasons. First, a section 1983
240. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Portsmouth v. Colander, 258 Va. 417, 419, 519 S.E.2d 374,
375 (1999).
241. See supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
243. Spargo, 351 F.3d at 75 (citing Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
848 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
244. See id. at 74-75.
245. Ancient Art Tattoo Studio, Ltd. v. City of Virginia Beach, 263 Va. 593, 597, 561
S.E.2d 690, 692 (2002) (citations omitted). A writ of mandamus would apply only to the
JIRC's ministerial act of applying established due process rules to its proceedings or sus-
pension hearings. See In re Commonwealth's Att'y for Roanoke, 265 Va. 313, 317, 576
S.E.2d 458, 461 (2003). A writ of mandamus would not apply to the JIRC's discretionary
act of deciding whether to suspend a judge and subsequently hold a hearing, or to conduct
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suit provides a judge with an adequate remedy at law in state
court; thus, a writ of mandamus is likely unavailable. Second, a
judge who must file a writ of mandamus to ensure his due process
rights are not violated may violate Virginia Code section 17.1-
913. Section 17.1-913 guarantees the confidentiality of JIRC pro-
ceedings and prevents judges and other involved parties from di-
vulging information regarding JIRC proceedings to persons not
involved with the proceedings. 246 The filing of a writ of manda-
mus necessarily requires a judge to divulge information pertain-
ing to JIRC proceedings to a non-interested party, a possible vi-
olation of the Virginia Code. Also, as in section 1983 suits, to file
a writ of mandamus a judge must sacrifice his right to confiden-
tiality to protect his right to due process. 247 Thus, a writ of man-
damus is an unsavory and possibly impermissible option.
Given the insufficiency of alternative avenues to enforcing
judges' due process rights, the remaining question is: What ac-
ceptable remedy is available to judges whose due process rights
have been violated? The answer requires rejecting the Shull
court's narrow construction of its jurisdiction under article VI,
section 1, and adopting a broad view of the court's jurisdiction
over matters relating to the censure, removal, or retirement of a
judge under article VI, section 10.248 A broad reading of the
court's jurisdictional mandate would view any JIRC proceeding,
from the investigation of a complaint to its final adjudication be-
fore the supreme court-or procedural aspect therein-as a "mat-
ter" relating to the censure, removal, or retirement of a judge. A
similarly broad interpretation is currently employed in Virginia's
circuit courts. Circuit courts, which have original jurisdiction in
some criminal matters, 249 possess jurisdiction to rule that prose-
cutorial action prior to the filing of a formal charge in circuit
court violated the defendant's due process rights and is invalid. 250
the procedural aspects of its investigation. See id. at 317-18, 576 S.E.2d at 461.
246. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-913 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
247. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
248. An alternative approach to resolving any conflict in interpretation would be for
the General Assembly to amend the constitution or Virginia Code to grant explicitly the
supreme court jurisdiction over the JIRC procedures that occur prior to the filing of a for-
mal charge.
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-513 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
250. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dickens, 73 Va. Cir. 437 (Cir. Ct. 2007) (Norfolk City)
(holding that a defendant was entitled to due process during a probation revocation hear-
ing).
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A wider reading is also necessary to ensure the protection of the
rule of law because "most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
are procedural, [and] it is procedure that marks much of the dif-
ference between rule by law and rule by fiat."251
Having established the supreme court possesses jurisdiction to
hear such claims, the question then becomes how the court should
have analyzed the procedural due process in Shull. The due
process guarantee in Virginia's constitution provides "[t]hat no
person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."252 Procedural due process inquiries require
answering two questions: (1) whether the "government action af-
fects an interest in life, liberty, or property," and (2) "what proce-
dural requirements of due process of law extend to the interest
affected by [the] government action."2 5 3
The Supreme Court of Virginia established in Elliott that
judges have liberty interests in their posts as judges254 and that
summary suspensions impede those interests. 255 The removal of
251. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
252. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. The Constitution of Virginia virtually mirrors the U.S.
Constitution, which states that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
253. JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL. JUDICIAL CONDUCT & ETHICS 13-24 (4th ed. 2007); see also
Klimko v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 216 Va. 750, 754, 222 S.E.2d 559, 563-64 (1976) (en
banc).
254. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
255. A summary suspension may also affect a judge's property interests. Courts often
hold that a suspension with pay is, at most, a de minimis deprivation of property rights,
and some courts deny that property rights are deprived at all. See Pitts v. Bd. of Educ.,
869 F.2d 555, 556 (10th Cir. 1989) (two-day suspension with pay did not deprive tenured
teacher of measurable property interest and does not implicate due process concerns);
Hardiman v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 635, 638 (11th Cir. 1983) (nine-day
suspension with pay of tenured teacher involved de minimis property interest); see also
Hunt v. Prior, 673 A.2d 514, 524 (Conn. 1996) ("[Clourts have consistently concluded that
a suspension with pay does not implicate an employee's constitutionally protected proper-
ty interest." (citing Swick v. City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1993); Hicks v. City of
Watonga, Okla., 942 F.2d 737, 746 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991); Royster v. Bd. of Trustees, 774
F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1985))). These cases, however, mostly deal with situations where
an employee is suspended for a short period of time: two days and nine days, for example.
Suspensions by the JIRC frequently last for months, sometimes years. Recently, Judge
Tripp of the Norfolk Circuit Court has been absent for three months, although the reason
for his absence remains unclear. Washington, No Explanation Yet on 3-Month Absence of
Judge, supra note 97. Nevertheless, Judge Shull was suspended for eleven months, Judi-
cial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 661, 651 S.E.2d 648, 650 (2007), and
Judge Elliott was suspended for twenty-two months. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v.
Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 105, 630 S.E.2d 485, 488 (2006). One can certainly argue that suspen-
sions of such a long duration cannot constitute a de minimis deprivation of a property in-
terest. Further, the position of "judge" entails more than simply receiving monies from the
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a judge from his office affects his liberty interests because a sus-
pension damages the judge's 'good name, reputation, honor,
[and] integrity."' 256 The Elliott court established this liberty right
with regard to when a judge is censured, and the right has equal
applicability to a judge's suspension. A judge's suspension results
in a void in the courthouse that is filled not only with other
judges taking over the suspended judge's docket, but also with
rumors.257 In 2007, Judge Alfred Tripp's absence from his post as
a Norfolk Circuit Court judge was noticed and the media's inves-
tigation of the matter revealed that he had been "barred from the
courthouse." 258 Further, media coverage of Judge Tripp's absence
included a discussion of the JIRC and his possible suspension. 259
A judge's suspension is supposed to be non-public and that no-
tion, if true, would tend to negate the contention that suspension
violates a judge's liberty interest as there would be little, if any,
damage to the judge's good name, reputation, honor, and integri-
ty. Such a view, however, ignores the real-world implications of a
judge's suspension. The sudden disappearance of a judge, often
for months at a time, 260 raises questions in the minds of not only
courthouse staff, litigants, and attorneys, but also the media and
the public in general. The expediency with which observers raise
questions and make reports of a judge's absence and possible sus-
pension should not be a surprise in light of the fact that media
outlets have staff devoted strictly to "covering courts."261 The re-
commonwealth's coffers. Judges must uphold the constitution, administer the law, and
protect Virginia's judicial integrity. A judge is deprived of the ability to administer the du-
ties of his office while suspended, even with pay. Thus, it is likely that a summary suspen-
sion with pay also affects a judge's property interests; no court has yet made such a de-
termination, however.
256. Elliott, 272 Va. at 114, 630 S.E.2d at 493 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)); see also Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437 ("[W]here the State at-
taches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play .... [And] where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the gov-
ernment is doing to him," due process is required).
257. See Michelle Washington, Judge Barred From Court, Source Says, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Oct. 23, 2007, at B8 [hereinafter Washington, Judge Barred from Court].
258. Washington, No Explanation Yet on 3-Month Absence of Judge, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Jan. 16, 2008, at B2.
259. See id.; see also Needless Suspense, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 27, 2007, at B8; Wash-
ington, Judge Barred From Court, supra note 257.
260. See supra note 255.
261. A simple Google search of "covers courts" reveals a litany of reporters whose sole
job is to investigate and report upon happenings in the courts. See, e.g., Valerie Orleans,
L.A. TIMES, Staff Writer Covers Courts, Sheriff's Department .. .and Fires, Working for
California, http://campusapps.fullerton.edu/news/working-for_-CA/pfeifer.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2008); OC Watchdog Contributors, The Orange County Register, http://www.ocreg
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cent media coverage about Judge Tripp is not unique. Judge
Shull faced the same scrutiny; so too did Judges Milbourne, 262 El-
liott,263 and Edmonds.264 Time after time, the unexplained dis-
appearance of a judge quickly results in reports of suspension and
misbehavior being distributed in mass media outlets, thereby
damaging that judge's name, reputation, honor, and integrity.
The JIRC's act of suspending a judge, therefore, affects a sus-
pended judge's liberty interest.
The inquiry then turns to what process judges must be af-
forded.265 Unlike other states, Virginia has not decided what due
process must be given to a judge during a suspension hearing.
Several states hold that a suspension proceeding seriously pena-
lizes a judge and fundamental due process requirements such as
notice, the right to counsel, and the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses must be met. 266 The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington has been credited with taking the "most logical and enligh-
tened approach to this question."267 The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington concluded in In re Deming that judges must have the right
to:
(1) notice of the charge and the nature and cause of the accusation in
writing; (2) notice, by name, of the person or persons who brought
the complaint; (3) appear and defend in person or by counsel; (4) tes-
tify in his own behalf; (5) the opportunity to confront witnesses face
to face; (6) subpoena witnesses in his own behalf; (7) be apprised of
the intention to make the matter public; (8) appear and orally argue
the merits of the holding of a public hearing; (9) prepare and present
a defense; (10) a hearing within a reasonable time; (11) the right to
appeal.268
ister.com/articles/strong-ocregister-reach-1646529-href-register (last visited Oct. 10, 2008);
Michelle Washington, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, http://hamptonroads.com/2007/10/michelle-wash
ington (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
262. See Alan Cooper, Eastern Shore J & DR Judge Has Been Suspended, VA. LAW.
WKLY., Aug. 8, 2005, at 3.
263. See Secrecy Breeds Suspicion in Portsmouth, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 30, 2004, at
B10.
264. Marc Davis, Judge on Leave To Deal with Claims of Misdeed, Legal Sources Re-
port, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 20, 1996, at Bi.
265. See Klimko v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 216 Va. 750, 756, 222 S.E.2d 559, 565
(1976) ("Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process
is due." (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))).
266. See, e.g., In re Haggerty, 241 So.2d 469 (La. 1970); In re Peoples, 250 S.E.2d 890
(N.C. 1978).
267. Shaman, supra note 202, at 836.
268. 736 P.2d 639, 650 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
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These requirements, including (1) notice; (2) disclosure of evi-
dence against the accused; (3) the ability to be heard, present evi-
dence, and call witnesses; (4) confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses;269 (5) "a 'neutral and detached' hearing body"; and (6) a
statement explaining the reason for the government's action and
the evidence supporting the action, 270 are consistent with Virgin-
ia's due process requirements in other proceedings.
These procedural due process rights merely ensure that the
JIRC's "exercise of its authority to oversee the conduct of judges
is held to the same high standard of fair dealing every citizen has
the right to expect from the government."271 The supreme court
recognized this in Elliott, requiring "adequate procedural safe-
guards to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of the rights and
property interests of a judge who stands accused of official mis-
conduct." 272 The court's rational holding in Elliott makes its rea-
soning in Shull that much more suspect. The only solace one may
take in the court's decision in Shull is that it seems to confuse
Judge Shull's constitutional challenge to the suspension hearing
process with a challenge to the suspension hearing conclusion.273
This differentiation would lend itself to limitation of the decision
to the facts of the case, thereby negating its precedential value.
Nevertheless, the court's language that neither the constitution
nor the Virginia Code grants the court authority to review the
"suspension hearing procedures" is cause for concern and should
be remedied the next time the supreme court is presented with
such a challenge, or via a constitutional amendment specifically
authorizing the supreme court with such jurisdiction. The drastic
269. See Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 235, 241-42, 321 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1984)
(holding that the Commonwealth may not deprive a person of her property rights without
giving her notice, a hearing, and the "opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses" because to do so would violate her due process rights (citing Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970))).
270. Copeland v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 754, 756, 419 S.E.2d 294, 295 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 489).
271. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 114, 630 S.E.2d 485, 493
(2006).
272. Id.
273. The court discusses how it is the JIRC, not the supreme court, that is vested with
the power to "determine whether a judge should be suspended .... Judicial Inquiry &
Review Comm'n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 671, 651 S.E.2d 648, 656 (2007) (emphasis added).
Judge Shull "raise[d] certain due process arguments concerning the manner in which the
[JIRC] conducted the suspension hearing." Id. (emphasis added).
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act of removing a judge from office and its far-reaching conse-
quences demand a broad interpretation of the court's jurisdiction.
B. Supervision Agreements
Neither the constitutional provision nor the enabling statute
providing for the JIRC's creation supports the JIRC rule allowing
the Commission to enter into supervision agreements with ac-
cused judges in lieu of filing formal charges against those judges.
Nevertheless, such supervision agreements are necessary to pro-
tect the integrity of the judiciary and the privacy of judges. As
previously mentioned, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
the issue of whether the JIRC has authority to enter into supervi-
sion agreements in Elliott.274 The majority's argument that the
JIRC does have such authority answered the question in the
short term, but the unsoundness of the court's rationale leaves
much to be desired in terms of long-term legal precedent. Thus, a
constitutional amendment authorizing the JIRC to enter into su-
pervision agreements is necessary to maintain the rule of law.
The first problem with the majority's decision in Elliott rests in
its interpretation of the word "shall" as permissive rather than
mandatory. 275 Thus, instead of being required to file a formal
charge against a judge, the JIRC has discretion as to whether it
should file such a charge. 276 As Justice Keenan points out in her
dissent, such a reading fails to comply with the court's own inter-
pretation of the word "shall."277
Nevertheless, there is a simple remedy. The word "shall" is
used only in the JIRC's own rules, whereas "may" is used in both
the constitutional and statutory provisions addressing the sub-
ject.278 Thus, the JIRC can resolve the problem by substituting
274. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
275. See Elliott, 272 Va. at 118, 630 S.E.2d at 495-96.
276. See id., 630 S.E.2d at 496.
277. Id. at 124-25, 630 S.E.2d at 499-500 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
278. Compare Va. Judicial Inquiry & Review R. 15(A)(2) ("If the [JIRC] finds the
charges against the judge to be well founded and of sufficient gravity to constitute the ba-
sis for retirement, censure or removal, it shall file a complaint against the judge in the
Supreme Court of Virginia.") (emphasis added), with VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10 ('If the
[JIRC] finds the charges to be well-founded, it may file a formal complaint before the Su-
preme Court.") (emphasis added) and VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum.
Supp. 2008) ("If the [JIRC] finds the charges to be well-founded, and sufficient to consti-
tute the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge, it may file a formal complaint
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"may" instead of "shall" in its own rule. If the JIRC makes such a
change, the Commission certainly would be allowed to use its dis-
cretion in determining whether to file a formal charge against a
judge, even if a complaint is well-founded. To avoid belaboring
the interpretation subject further, the problem with the majori-
ty's opinion is easily fixed and the issue rather minute. This is
especially true in comparison to the more glaring issue of whether
the action discussed in Elliott-the entering into of supervision
agreements-is even constitutionally permissible.
"[T]he Constitution and statutes of Virginia preclude[ ] the
[JIRC] from entering into [supervision] agreement[s]." 2 79 The ma-
jority in Elliott held otherwise and analogized the use of supervi-
sion agreements by the JIRC to the use of immunity agreements
by a prosecutor.280 This comparison, however, not only is inaccu-
rate, but actually disproves the majority's point. An immunity
agreement is a contract between an alleged criminal defendant
and the Commonwealth whereby the prosecution abstains from
bringing criminal charges against the accused in exchange for as-
sistance in another matter. 28 1 A supervision agreement is similar
to an immunity agreement in that the JIRC abstains from filing a
formal complaint with the supreme court, 28 2 but the similarities
end there. The consideration the judge gives in a supervision
agreement is not assistance in another matter, but rather is his
compliance with certain requirements including, but in no way
limited to, retiring from the bench, issuing letters of apology, or
attending drug or alcohol rehabilitation courses.283
Furthermore, absent from the immunity agreement on which
the majority relies is the punishment aspect of supervision
agreements. No one would contend that a prosecutor could re-
quire a criminal defendant to enter drug or alcohol rehabilitation
or issue letters of apology in exchange for the Commonwealth
agreeing not to file criminal charges against the defendant. Fur-
ther, no one would argue that the prosecution could affix addi-
tional charges on a criminal defendant for failing to comply with
the prosecution's order. Such forms of punishment-which im-
before the Supreme Court.") (emphasis added).
279. Elliott, 272 Va. at 124, 630 S.E.2d at 499 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 119, 630 S.E.2d at 496 (majority opinion).
281. See id.
282. See id. at 116-17, 630 S.E.2d at 494-95.
283. See, e.g., id. at 106-07, 630 S.E.2d at 489.
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pinge a person's liberty-must be affixed by a court: it is a court
that administers the rule of law under the guidance of due
process.
More analogous to a supervision agreement is a plea agree-
ment. In a plea agreement, the prosecution agrees to dismiss
charges and the defendant agrees to plead guilty and to accept
the court's punishment.284 As part of the agreement, the prosecu-
tor can recommend that such punishment be parole with either a
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights,285 enrollment in an alco-
ho1286 or drug287 rehabilitation program, or general supervision
by a parole officer.288 Further, a defendant faces additional
charges if he violates the conditions of the parole as outlined in
the plea agreement. 28 9 Plea and immunity agreements are "mar-
kedly different": the former requires the court's approval and the-
reafter affixes punishment, whereas the latter does not require
court approval and says nothing about punishment.290 Thus,
agreements that adjudicate a form of punishment, such as plea
and supervision agreements, must have court approval. Whereas
plea agreements satisfy this approval requirement, the JIRC has
deemed itself able to enter into supervision agreements without
any guidance or approval from the court. Such a self-grant of
power to affix punishment circumscribes the JIRC's constitution-
al and statutory mandate of investigating charges, 291 enters the
realm of adjudication, and is simply not allowed.
The second major issue with the JIRC giving itself the power to
enter into supervision agreements is the lack of guidance availa-
ble to the Commission for executing such agreements. One of the
tenets of democracy is 'that the rights of men are to be deter-
284. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:8 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
285. See, e.g., Anderson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 565, 568, 490 S.E.2d 274, 275
(Ct. App. 1997).
286. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
287. See, e.g., Vincent v. Warden of the Dillwyn Corr. Ctr., 258 Va. 48, 52, 517 S.E.2d
17, 19 (1999).
288. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Commonwealth, No. 1623-00-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 105 (Ct.
App. Feb. 19, 2002) (unpublished decision).
289. See, e.g., id. at 50, 517 S.E.2d at 18.
290. Hood v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 176, 181, 608 S.E.2d 913, 915 (2005).
291. See Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 444, 611 S.E.2d
392, 400 (2005) ("The [JIRC's] function is only to determine whether 'the charges are well-
founded, and sufficient to constitute the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a
judge .... " (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008))).
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mined by the law itself, and not by the let or leave of administra-
tive officers or bureaus."' 292 In Chapel v. Commonwealth, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia addressed the issue of whether a statute
creating the State Dry Cleaners Board provided proper legislative
guidance in authorizing the board to create and issue rules regu-
lating, among other things, the suspension of dry cleaning busi-
ness licenses.293 The statute in question authorized the board to
create rules "as it deemed necessary to regulate and control the
business."294 Such a broad legislative mandate, however, gave the
board unchecked discretion to create rules without "any standard
or test to guide and control the exercise of such discretion," and
the statute was therefore invalid.295
Any grant of power or delegation of authority to an administra-
tive officer or bureau to issue rules affecting the rights of men
and women must be accompanied by the establishment of a rea-
sonable standard or test to guide the exercise of that authority.296
Otherwise, the unguided grant of power and unlimited discretion
of the agency is "discriminatory [and] must be regarded as an at-
tempted delegation of the legislative function offensive both to the
State and the Federal Constitution."297 It makes no difference
that such an unguided grant of power and discretion is couched in
terms of public safety or good. 298
The Virginia Code simply grants the JIRC "the authority to
make rules, not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter or of
general law, to govern investigations and hearings conducted by
it."299 Nowhere within the statute is there a standard or test to
offer guidance for the promulgation of rules that address the
JIRC's ability to forego filing a formal complaint with the su-
preme court by entering into a supervision agreement. Indeed,
292. Chapel v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 406, 410, 89 S.E.2d 337, 340 (1955) (quoting
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 379, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (1930)).
293. Id. at 409-10, 89 S.E.2d at 340.
294. Id. at 414, 89 S.E.2d at 342.
295. Id. at 415, 89 S.E.2d at 343.
296. Id. at 411, 89 S.E.2d at 340-41.
297. Id. at 413, 89 S.E.2d at 342.
298. Andrews v. Bd. of Supervisors of Loudoun County, 200 Va. 637, 641, 107 S.E.2d
445, 448 (1959) ("A delegation of legislative power to an administrative officer or board is
not brought within the permissible limits of such designation by describing the public wel-
fare or good as a standard for the actions of the administrative officer or board." (citing
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 416-18 (1935))).
299. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
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the entire Virginia Code is devoid of any mention of supervision
agreements. The absence of any direction or limitation raises
questions as to where the JIRC's power or discretion begins and
ends. Would a supervision agreement requiring a judge to enter
into drug or alcohol rehabilitation, pay a fine commensurate with
the JIRC's investigative expenses, retire from the bench altogeth-
er, issue letters of apology, or anything else a creative mind could
conjure up, fall within the confines of the JIRC's power? If so,
when would such terms be appropriate? The utter nonexistence of
guidance provided to the JIRC creates an aura of unlimited power
for the Commission. As in Chapel, the unlimited discretion of the
JIRC to issue rules without any standard, test, or guidance rend-
ers the rule invalid.
The third issue with the JIRC entering into supervision agree-
ments is glaring: the General Assembly has never given such a
grant of power to the JIRC. The only mention of supervision
agreements comes in JIRC Rule 15(A)(4).300 Further, the only
mention of the JIRC's ability to create rules is in Virginia Code
section 17.1-902, which states the JIRC may issue rules "to go-
vern investigations and hearings conducted by it."301 Justice
Keenan took issue with Rule 15(A)(4) in her dissent in Elliott for
this very reason.302
As background, the delegation of legislative power to agencies
is necessary because "[t]hey have none within themselves."303 An
agency cannot create its own power out of whole cloth; the legisla-
ture must delegate the power to the agency. Once the legislature
does so, a government entity is "'limited to the making of reason-
able regulations to carry out the purposes and provisions of [its
enabling statute], provided they are not in conflict with the
[enabling statute] or the general laws of the State."'304
The Constitution of Virginia grants the JIRC investigative
powers only and states the single action that the Commission
may take as a result of an investigation is to file (or not file) a
300. Va. Judicial Inquiry & Review R. 15(A)(4).
301. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
302. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 125-27, 630 S.E.2d 485, 500-01 (Kennan, J., dissenting).
303. Commonwealth v. Anheuser-Busch, 181 Va. 678, 680, 26 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1943).
304. Chapel v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 406, 412, 89 S.E.2d 337, 341 (1955) (quoting
Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 322, 24 S.E.2d 550, 555 (1943)).
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formal complaint. 305 Further, although the JIRC is allowed to
create rules, the creation of such rules may address "the proce-
dure for investigations and hearings" only. 306 Absent is a grant of
power to the JIRC to regulate generally the commonwealth's
judges via suspension agreements. 30 7
To see this distinction more clearly one need look no further
than the statutes addressing the regulation of attorneys. 308 The
General Assembly gave the Supreme Court of Virginia, among
other provisions dealing with the regulation of the legal profes-
sion, the power to issue rules addressing the regulation of attor-
neys. 309 Specifically, by statute, the supreme court has the power
to "[p]rescrib[e] procedures for disciplining, suspending, and dis-
barring attorneys."310 The supreme court subsequently issued
Rule 13(B)(5)(b), which gives the Virginia State Bar the power
"not only to investigate charges of misfeasance, but to dispose of
those charges by imposing license suspension, probation with or
without terms, reprimands, and in some cases financial penal-
ties."3 1 1
As compared to the statutes addressing the supreme court's
power to regulate attorneys, the problem with the JIRC's power
to enter into supervision agreements is obvious-the JIRC has no
such power. Neither the constitution nor the General Assembly
has given the JIRC regulatory power to supervise, punish, or in
any way govern judges' conduct. 312 It is counterintuitive that the
supreme court's ability to regulate attorneys would necessitate an
explicit mandate from the General Assembly, but that the JIRC
would require no such empowerment. 313
305. Elliott, 272 Va. at 125, 630 S.E.2d at 500 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 126, 630 S.E.2d at 500 ("The [JIRC] shall have the authority to make rules,
not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter or of general law, to govern investigations
and hearings conducted by it." (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum.
Supp. 2008))).
307. Id.
308. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3900 to -3944 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum.
Supp. 2008).
309. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3909 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
310. Id.
311. Elliott, 272 Va. at 126, 630 S.E.2d at 500 (Keenan, J., dissenting); see also VA.
SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, para. 13(B)(5)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
312. See Elliott, 272 Va. at 126, 630 S.E.2d at 500 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
313. Other examples of regulatory agencies to which the General Assembly has given a
grant of both regulatory powers and investigatory powers are "the Board of Dentistry, the
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Finally, although it is true that the JIRC may decide not to file
a formal complaint with the supreme court, such discretion in no
way authorizes supervision agreements. 314 One cannot interpret
the JIRC's grant of power to refrain from acting as a grant of
power to the JIRC to condition its restraint on compelling a judge
to comply with an agreement the JIRC has no authority to
create. 31 5 To hold otherwise creates authority in an agency from
that agency's own absence of authority, and is in direct conflict
with the requirement that the legislature must delineate specifi-
cally such powers to the agency. 316
The Constitution of Virginia and the General Assembly have
made the JIRC an investigative agency-not a regulatory agency,
provided no guidance for entering into supervision agreements,
and, in fact, failed to grant the JIRC power to enter into supervi-
sion agreements. Despite that the JIRC's current practice of en-
tering into supervision agreements is beyond the scope of its pow-
ers and is invalid, it would behoove the General Assembly to
amend the constitution to allow the JIRC to enter into supervi-
sion agreements.
Not every judge who has a well-founded complaint filed against
him is necessarily a bad judge who should face public censure,
forced retirement, or removal. Indeed, many complaints are based
on the fact that judges are human and subject to human frailties.
For instance, a judge with an alcohol problem should not have to
face public scrutiny for his problem via a trial if he is willing to
enter into a treatment program and get well, for the same rea-
sons attorneys and other professionals have that option. Indeed,
it is not hard to imagine an attorney declining even to file a com-
plaint with the JIRC about a judge's alcohol problem for fear of
putting that judge under the microscope of public scrutiny.
Supervision agreements, however, would allow the JIRC to re-
quire a judge to successfully complete a treatment program before
returning to the bench when a well-founded complaint is made.
The benefits to permitting an alcohol treatment program via a
supervision agreement are many: protection of the judiciary's in-
Board of Medicine, the Board of Nursing, the Board of Pharmacy, [and] the Board of Ac-
countancy." Id.
314. Id. at 126-27, 630 S.E.2d at 500-01.
315. Id. at 127, 630 S.E.2d at 500-01.
316. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 501.
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tegrity, efficiency in the handling of complaints, the curing of a
person with an alcohol problem, and the maintenance of an oth-
erwise proficient jurist on the bench. The current construct of the
JIRC's authority, however, does not allow for such supervision
agreements under sound legal principles. Thus, a constitutional
amendment granting the JIRC such authority is necessary.
C. Summary Suspensions
The statutory provision granting the JIRC power to summarily
suspend a judge is beyond the scope of the constitutional amend-
ment authorizing the General Assembly's creation of the JIRC,
and is therefore unconstitutional. Further, separation of powers
and the public's interest in the integrity of the judiciary require
that the Supreme Court of Virginia-not the JIRC-holds the
power to administer such suspensions. Importantly, however, the
suspension of a judge during the pendency of his investigation
should be confidential; yet, where a judge poses a substantial and
immediate threat to the public interest in the performance of his
judicial duties, the need for confidentiality is mitigated.
The Constitution of Virginia authorizes the JIRC's creation and
its performance of a limited number of functions. These functions
include (1) investigating charges of judicial malfeasance, (2) con-
vening hearings and subpoenaing witnesses and documents in
furtherance of such investigations, and (3) filing formal com-
plaints when an investigation reveals that charges are well-
founded.317 Any adjudicative measures, however, are the respon-
sibility of the Supreme Court of Virginia: under article VI, section
10 of the Constitution of Virginia, the court is vested with the ex-
press power to remove a judge from the bench.318 The only other
constitutionally mandated means by which a judge can be re-
moved is impeachment by the General Assembly.319 Yet, by al-
lowing the JIRC to summarily suspend a judge, the General As-
sembly, on its own accord, created another avenue for the
removal of judges. 320
317. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
318. Id.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 14-34.
320. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-911 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
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Typically, the General Assembly has virtually unlimited power
to make laws because "the Constitution is not a grant of power,
but a restriction upon ... power."321 That is, the constitution
should not be consulted to ascertain whether the General Assem-
bly may do something, but rather, whether the General Assembly
may not do something by either expressed or necessary implica-
tion. 322 Nevertheless, "[a]n act is unconstitutional if it is express-
ly prohibited or is prohibited by necessary implication based upon
the provisions of the Constitution of Virginia."323 For example,
the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius-"the grant-
ing of certain powers is the exclusion of all others"-often applies
by necessary implication to prohibit the General Assembly from
exercising particular powers. 324
The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius is especial-
ly relevant in the context of removing judges from the bench. The
constitution provides that the legislative and judicial branches of
government should be separate and distinct. 32 5 Thus, the judi-
ciary has no authority to remove a member of the General As-
sembly from office. Similarly, the constitution begins with a broad
prohibition on the General Assembly removing judges, but it then
carves out two exceptions. The constitution's grant to the General
Assembly of two specific powers-impeachment and removal by
the supreme court-is to the exclusion of all other powers because
anything beyond these two methods violates separation of pow-
ers. Nevertheless, in section 17.1-911, the General Assembly
created a third way of removing a judge: summary suspension by
the JIRC. The General Assembly's creation of removal by sum-
mary suspension is, as shown, ultra vires.
321. Pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 822, 93 S.E. 652, 654-55 (1917).
322. Id. ("In determining whether an act of the legislature is forbidden by the State
Constitution, it must be borne in mind that the Constitution is not a grant of power, but a
restriction upon an otherwise practically unlimited power; that the Constitution is to be
looked to, not to ascertain whether a power has been conferred, but whether it has been
taken away; that the legislature is practically omnipotent in the matter of legislation, ex-
cept in so far as it is restrained by the Constitution, expressly or by plain, or ... by neces-
sary, implications .... ").
323. Marshall v. N. Va. Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419, 428, 657 S.E.2d 71, 75 (2008) (cita-
tions omitted).
324. Pine, 121 Va. at 821-22, 93 S.E. at 654.
325. VA. CONST. art. I, § 5 ('That the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of
the Commonwealth should be separate and distinct."); VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 ('The legis-
lative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct").
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Along the same lines, article VI, section 10 of the Constitution
of Virginia fully addresses the power of the JIRC; thus, anything
granted to the JIRC beyond that power is ultra vires. The consti-
tution often prohibits or requires certain actions by the General
Assembly, but there are also instances where a constitutional
provision is "either permissive or declaratory."326 Such instances
often occur where a constitution is so detailed in its provision that
it resembles legislation, and, because "the Constitution has fully
dealt with a subject and covered the entire ground, the legislature
would be powerless to make any change in it."327 Sections 100
and 101 of Virginia's 1902 constitution were such provisions be-
cause they addressed the judiciary, which "[t]he convention had
dealt fully with... and marked out a complete system." 328 Thus,
if the General Assembly was to change the construct of the judi-
ciary "in any way," the constitution had to specifically give the
General Assembly such power. 329
Like Virginia's 1902 constitution, Virginia's current constitu-
tion fully deals with, and marks out, a complete system for the
judiciary. Further, the provision creating the JIRC resembles leg-
islation in that it is detailed and specifically outlines the organi-
zation and power of the JIRC. The supreme court stated that the
powers of the JIRC are "limited to determining whether...
'charges [are] well-founded, and sufficient to constitute the basis
for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge,' thereby resulting
in a complaint being filed in [the Supreme] Court."330 This is the
constitutional limit of the JIRC's powers: no more, no less. Al-
though
[t]he Legislature ... to a large extent represents the Commonwealth,
... it does so in subordination to the Constitution of the State. It can
do nothing which that instrument prohibits and, in what is confided
to it, must conform in its mode of action to the requirements of the
Constitution. If it transcends its power, or if it acts in contravention
of the Constitution, its acts are void; they confer no rights and bind
no man, and all the world is charged with notice of the limitations
which the Constitution imposes. 331
326. Pine, 121 Va. at 824, 93 S.E. at 655.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 825, 93 S.E. at 656.
329. Id.
330. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 670, 651 S.E.2d 648,
655-56 (2007) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-902) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2008)).
331. Ellinger v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 100, 105-06, 45 S.E. 807, 808 (1903).
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Thus, the General Assembly, by giving the JIRC power to sum-
marily suspend a judge, failed to conform its actions to the boun-
daries of the constitution and transcended its power; therefore, its
acts are void.
The problems with the JIRC having judicial suspension power
are readily apparent. In addition to the constitutional issues at
stake, practical considerations abound. For instance, one can en-
vision a scenario where a judge is presented with a case dealing
with a socially "hot" topic such as abortion or gun control. Assum-
ing the judge has staunch pro-choice or pro-gun control views,
which happen to be wholly adverse to the prevailing view of the
JIRC membership, it is not hard to imagine that a "charge" could
be filed against the judge and an unchecked332 determination
made that the judge constituted a substantial and immediate
threat which warranted his suspension. Thereafter, a judge with
views more similar to the JIRC's membership could be assigned
the case for a more "favorable" outcome.
Although the above scenario certainly takes a pessimistic view
of the powers that be, in designing a successful limited govern-
ment of checks and balances, such a view is required. Govern-
ment must be protected against itself to prevent the possibility of
tyranny and abuse of power. Peter Lynch once said, "Go for a
business that any idiot can run-because sooner or later, any
idiot probably is going to run it."333 The same can be said of gov-
ernment: design a form of government to protect against a tyrant
running it-because sooner or later, a tyrant probably is going to
run it. The example of the JIRC taking steps to alter the outcome
of litigation by summarily suspending a judge is not to say the
current, or any prior, JIRC has taken such action, but only that,
at some point in the future, such action could feasibly take place.
The drafters of article VI, section 10, recognized this and correctly
limited the power of the JIRC to investigations only. The General
332. In Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. Shull, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held the JIRC, "not this Court, is vested with the statutory authority to determine wheth-
er a judge should be suspended with pay until resolution of a pending investigation. More-
over, neither the Constitution nor the Code has given this Court authority to review the
[JIRC's] . . . decision to suspend a judge." Shull, 274 Va. at 671, 651 S.E.2d at 656. Thus,
there is no check on the JIRC's decision to summarily suspend a judge.
333. GEORGE THOMPSON, DON'T PLAY IN THE STREET ... UNLESS You KNow WHICH
DIRECTION YOUR STOCK Is TRAVELING 51 (2003).
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Assembly usurped this limitation by granting summary suspen-
sion powers to the JIRC in Virginia Code section 17.1-911.334
If the General Assembly wishes to allow a judge's suspension
during the pendency of a JIRC investigation because that judge
poses a threat to the public and the administration of justice, the
supreme court should be granted such power. The Supreme Court
of Virginia already possesses adjudicatory powers over judges and
therefore, granting the court suspension powers would not offend
the notion of separation of powers. The JIRC, upon its initial in-
vestigation and determination that the accused judge poses a
threat, could petition the court for a type of "emergency" review to
have the judge suspended while the investigation continues. It is
likely true that upon such a filing the proceedings would lose
their confidentiality, but if the judge poses a threat to the public
and the administration of justice sufficient to warrant immediate
suspension, the public interest outweighs the need for confiden-
tiality. If the General Assembly wishes to leave summary suspen-
sion powers to the JIRC, however, a constitutional amendment
granting such authority is necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt the intentions of the General Assembly in es-
tablishing the JIRC and the JIRC's actions in carrying out its du-
334. See Carlisle v. Hassan, 199 Va. 771, 776, 102 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1958) ("Where re-
strictions are imposed in the Constitution by express language or necessary implication
upon the power of the General Assembly, the restrictions may not be ignored, and legisla-
tion in contravention thereof is invalid."). An example of legislative usurpation of constitu-
tional power to create a similar JIRC agency played out in Alaska. See In re Inquiry Con-
cerning a Judge, 762 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1988). There, like in Virginia, a constitutional
amendment creating the Commission on Judicial Conduct granted exclusive adjudicatory
power in the Supreme Court of Alaska. See id. at 1294. Further, like in Virginia, the com-
mission was granted power to investigate charges of judicial misconduct and make rec-
ommendations to the supreme court for the suspension, removal, or censure of an accused
judge. See id. at 1293. The legislature also, however, gave the commission power to public-
ly censure an accused judge. Id. Upon a challenge to this grant of power, the supreme
court found the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 1296. In so holding, the court compared the
constitutional amendment, which was devoid of any grant of adjudicative power to the
commission, to similar constitutional amendments in New York and Texas where the state
constitutions "expressly provide[ ] that the commission on judicial conduct may act on its
own authority." Id. The Supreme Court of Alaska correctly concluded that "[b]ecause [the
constitution] only empowers the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct to recommend
sanctions to the Alaska Supreme Court, [the statute in question] is in conflict therewith"
and is therefore unconstitutional. Id.
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ties are noble, but even noble actions must comport with constitu-
tional limitations. Amending the Constitution of Virginia to solve
the above-mentioned problems in the design of the JIRC sounds
severe. Nevertheless, it is "[flar better [to] amend the constitution
than to violate it, or to sanction its violation, however good may
have been the motives of those by whom the act was passed."335
The JIRC's duty to ensure the integrity of the judiciary is dig-
nified and arduous for "[i]t is confidence in the men and women
who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of
the rule of law."336 The process by which the judiciary's integrity
is ensured, however, must itself adhere to the rule of law. If the
converse is true, those who ensure the rights of men and women,
certify the proper administration of justice, and demand the trust
of the public, are denied the safeguards of the very system they
vow to protect. Unless the General Assembly intends to treat Vir-
ginia's judges as having fewer rights and protections than an or-
dinary Virginia citizen, then the legislature must take action to
alter the system for handling allegations of judicial misconduct so
that it complies with constitutional and practical limitations.
Virginia's judges deserve no less.
Jeffrey D. McMahan, Jr. *
335. Miller v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 618, 622, 14 S.E. 161, 162 (1892).
336. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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